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QUESTIONING GENDER: POLICE INTERROGATION
OF DELINQUENT GIRLS
Barry C. Feld*
Early juvenile courts emphasized a child's "best interests" and
treated youths differently based on personal characteristics such as
race and gender.' Progressive reformers expected judges to handle
boys and girls differently because their circumstances and needs
differed. 2  Juvenile courts processed boys primarily for criminal
behavior and girls for noncriminal status offenses-e.g. runaway,
incorrigibility, or sexual precocity.3  In the 1970s, efforts to
deinstitutionalize status offenders led to substantial declines in the
numbers of girls detained and confined for noncriminal misconduct.4
More recently, juvenile justice officials and the public perceived an
increase in violent crimes like simple assault committed by girls.5
* Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A.
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Minnesota; Ph.D. Harvard
University.
1. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) (tracing the juvenile court's transformation from
a rehabilitative social welfare agency to a scaled-down criminal court); GEOFF K.
WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2012) (outlining a racial history of America's juvenile justice system).
2. See generally Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The Conundrum of Girls and
Juvenile Justice Processing, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE 485 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012) (discussing
the difficulties girls face in the juvenile justice system and recommending
further understanding of these problems to better help girls in the juvenile
justice system); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) (analyzing the handling of juvenile offenders before
and after the creation of a separate judical system for juveniles); STEVEN L.
SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920 (1977) (discussing the juvenile
justice system in its formative period).
3. See, e.g., Kempf-Leonard, supra note 2, at 489-95; SCHLOSSMAN, supra
note 2, at 178-80; Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of
Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48
HARV. EDUc. REV. 65, 70-76 (1978).
4. Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled Status Offenders? An
Alternative Interpretation of the Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 241, 242 (2009).
5. See Lawanda Ravoira & Vanessa Patino, Girl Matters: Unfinished
Work, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
157, 165 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2011) (noting "a growing misperception that girls
are becoming more violent"); Darrell Steffensmeier & Jennifer Schwartz,
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This, in turn, led policy makers and scholars to reexamine changing
patterns of offending and the role of gender in the juvenile justice
system.6
An important but seldom studied aspect of justice
administration is police interrogation of suspects. In the vast
majority of cases, the real trial occurs during police questioning.
Once a suspect confesses, the advantage tilts strongly to the State
and often leads to guilty pleas. Despite its crucial role, legal
scholars and criminologists have conducted remarkably little
research on how police question adult criminal suspects.7 They have
conducted even fewer studies on how police question juvenile
suspects.8 Researchers have not conducted any studies on whether
or how police question juvenile girls differently than juvenile boys.9
Are there genders differences in how youths waive Miranda or in
how police treat youths in interrogation? Do police question, and do
boys and girls respond differently in the interrogation room? How
do justice system personnel perceive girls in the interrogation room,
Trends in Girls' Delinquency and the Gender Gap: Statistical Assessment of
Diverse Sources, in THE DELINQUENT GIRL 50, 50-51 (Margaret A. Zahn ed.,
2009); Feld, supra note 4, at 241-42; Crystal A. Garcia & Jodi Lane, What a
Girl Wants, What a Girl Needs: Findings from a Gender-Specific Focus Group
Study, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 536, 536 (2013).
6. See Meda Chesney-Lind & Nikki Jones, Introduction to FIGHTING FOR
GIRLS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND VIOLENCE 1, 1-2 (Meda Chesney-Lind
& Nikki Jones eds., 2010) ("[C]hanges in the policing of girlhood and changes in
girls' structural and situational circumstances, rather than essential changes in
girls' behavior, largely explains the significant increases in girls [sic] arrests,
particularly for simple assault."); Barry C. Feld, Girls in the Juvenile Justice
System, in THE DELINQUENT GIRL, supra note 5, at 225 (analyzing the perceived
increase in violent offenses committed by girls and comparing treatment of boys
and girls in the juvenile justice system); Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Race and
Sex Disparity in Juvenile Justice Processing, in HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 53 (Elena L. Grigorenko ed., 2012)(describing gender disparities in the juvenile justice system); THE DELINQUENT
GIRL, supra note 5 (providing a compilation of research on delinquency among
girls). See generally Darrell Steffensmeier et al., An Assessment of Recent
Trends in Girls' Violence Using Diverse Longitudinal Sources: Is the Gender
Gap Closing?, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 355 (2005) (using the Uniform Crime Report,
National Crime Victimization Survey, Monitoring the Future, and National
Youth Risk Behavior Survey to examine trends in girls' violence and the gender
gap in juvenile justice).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE
4-5 (2008) [hereinafter LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION]; Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 266 (1996) [hereinafter
Leo, Interrogation Room].
8. See BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE
INTERROGATION ROOM 2 (2013) [hereinafter FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS].
See generally Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When
Cops Question Kids, 47 L. & Soc'Y REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Real
Interrogation] (analyzing police interrogations of older youths accused of
felonies).
9. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8.
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and do those perceptions affect police practices? This Article
presents quantitative and qualitative data to answers these
questions.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the origins
of juvenile courts and their disparate treatment of girls. It then
examines court decisions about interrogating juveniles,
developmental psychological research on adolescents' competence to
exercise legal rights, and prior research on police interrogation.
Part II describes the data and methodology in this study. Since
1994, Minnesota has required police to record custodial
interrogations of criminal suspects including juveniles. The study
analyzes 307 interrogation case files of sixteen- and seventeen-year-
old male and female delinquents charged with felony offenses. The
case files include interrogation tapes and transcripts, police reports
associated with the offense for which officers questioned youth, court
petitions, and sentences. Of the 307 interrogations, police
questioned thirty-three female suspects. I interviewed thirty-nine
justice system personnel about their perceptions of girls in the
interrogation room. Part III presents and analyzes quantitative and
qualitative data. The quantitative data reveal remarkably few
differences in how police questioned male and female delinquents.
The boys and girls waived Miranda rights at statistically similar
rates and police used similar tactics to question them. Despite their
objective similarities, interviews with juvenile justice personnel
report substantial differences in how they perceive boys and girls.
While some described girls as more cooperative than boys, most
offered much more negative characterizations of females, describing
them as emotional, confrontational, or verbally aggressive. Should
we be concerned that even if Miranda waivers and questioning
appear objectively similar, juvenile justice personnel may hold
inappropriate gender stereotypes? If police question boys and girls
similarly, then do negative gender stereotypes matter?
I. JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: GENDER AND POLICE
INTERROGATION
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts to separate
children from adult offenders and to rehabilitate and treat them
rather than to punish them for their crimes. 10  Delinquency
10. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE
ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980) (detailing the
history of America's prison system as a means for rehabilitation and treatment
of offenders); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT (1978) (explaining that reformers modified the juvenile justice
system in a good faith effort to create a constructive system to help juvenile
offenders); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING (2004)
(displaying the structural and conceptual changes in the juvenile justice system
over time); Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile
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proceedings focused on a child's background and welfare rather than
on the facts of a crime, and juvenile courts dispensed with formal
procedures such as lawyers, juries, or rules of evidence.11
In 1967, the Supreme Court in In re Gaultl2 began a due process
revolution that transformed the juvenile court from a social welfare
agency into a more formal, legal institution.13  Among other
procedural safeguards, Gault recognized that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination extended to delinquents.14
Although Progressive reformers rejected procedural safeguards,
Gault and its progeny transformed their conception of juvenile
courts as a social welfare agency and precipitated the procedural
convergence with criminal courts.' 5 By adopting some criminal
procedures, the Court shifted juvenile courts' focus from a child's
"real needs" to proof of criminal acts and formalized the connection
between crimes and sanctions.16
Justice, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2477 (2000) (explaining the policy motivations of those
who created the juvenile justice system in America).
11. See FELD, supra note 1, at 46-47; TANENHAUS, supra note 10, at 23-25
(describing Cook County, Illinois's first juvenile court).
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 1, at 165; ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE
STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 89-96 (2008); Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821
(1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment]; Barry C. Feld, The
Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 691-92 (1991)
[hereinafter Feld, Transformation-Part 1.
14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55; see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice,
supra note 13, at 154-55.
15. Subsequent Court decisions emphasized the criminal nature of
delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975)
(holding that the double jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment precluded
criminal re-prosecution of a youth as an adult after adjudication as a delinquent
for the same offense); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971)
(denying juveniles the right to a jury trial in state delinquency prosecutions); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that states must prove
delinquency by the criminal standard-beyond a reasonable doubt-rather than
by the lower civil standards of proof).
16. See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 13
(examining the evolution of procedural due process in juvenile courts); Barry C.
Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003) (analyzing the use of
delinquent convictions as sentencing enhancements); Feld, Transformation-
Part I, supra note 13 (tracing the transformation of the juvenile justice system
after the Gault decision); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV.
327 (1999) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation-Part II] (examining the changes
in the juvenile justice system due to a public perception of an increase in crime
among juveniles).
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Macro-structural, economic, and racial demographic changes in
American cities in the 1970s and 1980s increased homicide rates by
black youths in the late 1980s, and the crack cocaine and gun
violence epidemic of the early 1990s produced harsh "get-tough"
juvenile justice policies.' 7  The trend toward punitive action
increased the numbers of youths tried as adults and led to harsher
sanctions for delinquents. By the end of the twentieth century,
states' get-tough policies equated the crimes and culpability of
adolescents with those of adults-for example, "adult crime, adult
time."' 8 In the decades since Gault and states' adoption of get-tough
policies, police increasingly use routine arrest and booking
procedures to process juvenile offenders just like adults.19 Policy
makers perceived an increase in violent crimes committed by girls,
which exposed the girls to the same get-tough policies adopted to
confront youth violence more generally.
A. Gender and the Juvenile Court
Juvenile courts' delinquency jurisdiction initially included only
youths charged with violations of criminal law, but reformers added
noncriminal status offenses-for example, incorrigibility, runaway,
and immorality-to the courts' definition of delinquency within a
few years.20 Historically, juvenile courts processed boys mainly for
17. See generally FELD, supra note 1 (discussing social and demographic
changes that led to the war on crime and the legal changes that occurred
because of it); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998)
(discussing the perceived increase in youth violence in the 1990s); Alfred
Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995) (describing role of crack cocaine markets and gun
violence in escalation of homicide by black youths); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics,
and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash," 87
MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice]
(analyzing the change in juvenile justice policies in the second half of the
twentieth century); Feld, Transformation-Part II, supra note 16 (examining
the changes in the juvenile justice system due to a public perception of an
increase in crime among juveniles); Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment:
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
11 (2007) (analyzing the role that race has played in shaping juvenile justice
policies).
18. See generally Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility,
Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the
Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQUALITY 263 (2013) [hereinafter Feld,
Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing] (proposing a discount in
sentencing for young offenders); Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old
Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
107 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Youth Discount] (arguing that although courts
recognize the diminished culpability of juveniles, courts have not done enough
to take this into account in sentencing).
19. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION 369-76 (4th ed. 2013) (summarizing photographing and
fingerprinting practices of arrested juveniles).
20. See, e.g., id. at 7.
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criminal conduct and girls mainly for status offenses.21 The statusjurisdiction reflected Progressives' idea of childhood dependency and
paternalistic sexual attitudes. 22 From the juvenile courts' inception,
controlling female sexuality was a focal concern of judicial
intervention.23 Judges detained and incarcerated girls for minor
offenses and status offenses at higher rates than boys.24
Male juveniles commit most serious crimes, and evaluations ofjuvenile court sentencing practices focus primarily on racial rather
than gender disparities.25 Sentencing research on gender bias posits
chivalry or leniency to explain why girls receive less severe
sanctions than do boys.26 Other analysts invoke protectionist or
paternalistic explanations to account for why sexually active females
and status offenders receive more intrusive interventions than do
boys charged with minor offenses. 27 Earlier research consistently
reported a gender double standard in which juvenile courts
incarcerated proportionally more girls than boys charged for status
offenses, but sentenced boys charged with delinquency more
severely than similarly charged girls. 28 More recent studies report
21. See Feld, supra note 4. See generally SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 2.
22. See Kimberly Kempf-Leonard & Pernilla Johansson, Gender and
Runaways: Risk Factors, Delinquency, and Juvenile Justice Experiences, 5
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 308, 308-09 (2007); Schlossman & Wallach, supra
note 3, at 65-66.
23. See TANENHAUS, supra note 10, at 50-53; Schlossman & Wallach, supra
note 3, at 65-66.
24. See generally Kempf-Leonard, supra note 2 (discussing the difficulties
girls face in the juvenile justice system and recommending further
understanding of these problems to better handling of juvenile offenders before
and after the creation of a separate judical system for juveniles); SCHLOSSMAN,
supra note 2 (discussing the juvenile justice system in its formative period);
TANENHAUS, supra note 10 (explaining that the revival of status offenses
increased the arrest rate of girls).
25. Feld, supra note 4, at 257. See generally JOAN MCCORD ET. AL, JUVENILE
CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE (2001) (examining race in the juvenile justice system).
26. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoyt & David G. Scherer, Female Juvenile
Delinquency: Misunderstood by the Juvenile Justice System, Neglected by Social
Science, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81, 83 (1998).
27. See generally SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 2; Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls and
Status Offenses: Is Juvenile Justice Still Sexist?, 20 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 144(1988) [hereinafter Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses]; Meda Chesney-
Lind, Paternalism and the Female Status Offender, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121(1977); David R. Johnson & Laurie K. Scheuble, Gender Bias in the Disposition
of Juvenile Court Referrals: The Effects of Time and Location, 29 CRIMINOLOGY
677 (1991) (explaining the theory that courts may punish girls more harshly
than boys because of social ideas about what actions are appropriate for girls
compared to what is appropriate for boys); Schlossman & Wallach, supra note 3(concluding that discriminatory treatment of girls in the juvenile justice system
in the early twentieth century was due, in part, to social movements to purify
society).
28. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile
Justice Processing: Implications of the JJDP Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1162, 1163-64 (1992).
1064 [Vol. 49
2014] QUESTIONING GENDER 1065
fewer gender differences in sentencing status offenders once
analysts control for present offense and prior record.29 However,
analyses of judges' use of contempt power to sanction male and
female status offenders who violated a "valid court order" report
continuing differential treatment that covertly perpetuates gender
bias.30
In the early 1970s, critics of juvenile courts' status jurisdiction
objected that judges confined noncriminal offenders in institutions
with delinquents, stigmatized them with delinquency labels,
discriminated against females, and provided few beneficial
services.31 Judicial intervention on behalf of parents to control their
wayward girls exacerbated intra-family conflicts.32 In the early
1970s, states charged about three-quarters of the girls in their
juvenile courts with status offenses rather than criminal
delinquency.33
The 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 3 4
("JJDP Act") prohibited states from confining status offenders with
delinquents in secure facilities and withheld formula grant money
from states that did not develop plans to remove them.35 The JJDP
Act's mandate to Deinstitutionalize Status Offenders ("DSO") and
29. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MINIMAL GENDER BIAS OCCURRED IN
PROCESSING NONCRIMINAL JUVENILES 1-2 (1995); see also Meda Chesney-Lind &
Joanne Belknap, Trends in Delinquent Girls' Aggression and Violent Behavior,
in AGGRESSION, ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND VIOLENCE AMONG GIRLS: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 203, 209 (Martha Putallaz & Karen L. Bierman
eds., 2004) (reporting that girls received shorter sentences than boys when
convicted of similar offenses); Hoyt & Scherer, supra note 26, at 83-85.
30. See, e.g., AM. BAR AsS'N & NAT'L BAR AsS'N, JUSTICE BY GENDER: THE
LACK OF APPROPRIATE PREVENTION, DIVERSION AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES
FOR GIRLS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2001), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminaljustice-sectio
n_newsletter/crimjustjuvjusjusticebygenderweb.pdf ("Girls are more likely to
be cited for contempt, and because contempt offenders are more likely to be
detained than non-contempt offenders, gender can be correlated to detention
status through the use of contempt proceedings."); Bishop & Frazier, supra note
28, at 1167-68.
31. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 1, at 168-70; Ira M. Schwartz et al., Federal
Juvenile Justice Policy and the Incarceration of Girls, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 511,
511-20 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 31; Allan Sussman, Sex-Based
Discrimination and PINS Jurisdiction, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS
IN THE JUVENILE COURT (L.E. Teitelbaum & A.R. Gough eds., 1977).
33. Nat'l Council on Crime and Delinq., Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders
Should be Removed from the Juvenile Court: A Policy Statement, 21 CRIME &
DELINQ. 97, 99 (1975); Schwartz et al., supra note 31. In 2000, about one-
quarter of girls arrested by police were arrested for status offenses, compared
with only ten percent of boys. Chesney-Lind & Belknap, supra note 29, at 213
(2004).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (2012).
35. Id. § 5633. See generally IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN) JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES:
RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1989).
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increase procedural formality after Gault led to a sharp decline in
the number of females and status offenders in secure facilities.36 A
1980 amendment to the JJDP Act allowed states to continue to
receive federal funds and to confine status offenders if judges
committed them to institutions for contempt of court for violating a
"valid court order."3 7 This authority allowed judges to "bootstrap"
some status offenders-disproportionately female-into delinquents
for violating a court-ordered condition of probation-for example, do
not abscond from a nonsecure placement.38  The 1992
reauthorization of the JJDP Act required states to analyze and
provide "gender-specific services" to treat female delinquents, but
most states only collected data about girls rather than develop new
programs for them.39
As a result of the 1974 DSO initiatives, the number of status
offenders in detention facilities and institutions declined
dramatically by the early 1980s. Girls benefited especially because
states disproportionately confined them for noncriminal
misconduct. 40 By 1988, the number of status offenders in secure
36. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 1, at 175-76; CHERYL L. MAXSON & MALCOLM
W. KLEIN, RESPONDING TO TROUBLED YOUTH 12-13 (1997); NEITHER ANGELS NOR
THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 88-89 (Joel
F. Handler & Julie Zatz eds., 1982) [hereinafter NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES].
37. Feld, supra note 1, at 175-77.
38. See, e.g., Chesney-Lind & Belknap, supra note 29, at 207 (noting that
relabeling of girls' conflicts with parents from status offenses like incorrigibility
to assault "facilitates the incarceration of girls in detention facilities and
training schools," which would not be permitted if adjudicated for noncriminal
status offenses); Steffensmeier & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 54 (noting that one
consequence of making it more difficult to confine girls for status offenses has
been a trend to relabel minor offenses as assault in order to confine them);
Bishop & Frazier, supra note 28, at 1167-68 (describing "bootstrapping" of
female status offenders as delinquents and the confinement for contempt of
court); Hoyt & Scherer, supra note 26, at 83-84.
39. COMMUNITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, JUVENILE FEMALE OFFENDERS: A
STATUS OF THE STATES REPORT (1998) (evaluating states' efforts to implement
gender-specific services for girls in the juvenile justice system and finding that
more should be done); Kimberly Kempf-Leonard & Lisa L. Sample, Disparity
Based on Sex: Is Gender-Specific Treatment Warranted?, 17 JUST. Q. 89, 90-92
(2000); John M. MacDonald & Meda Chesney-Lind, Gender Bias and Juvenile
Justice Revisited: A Multiyear Analysis, 47 CRIME AND DELINQ. 173, 176-77
(2001). See generally Barbara Bloom et al., Improving Juvenile Justice for
Females: A Statewide Assessment in California, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 526 (2002)
(examining trends in girls' delinquency in California with the goal of meeting
gender specific needs in the juvenile justice system).
40. An early evaluation of the JJDP Act's DSO mandate by the National
Academy of Sciences reported a substantial reduction in the detention and
confinement of status offenders. NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES, supra note 36,
at 88-89; Feld, supra note 1, at 176. See generally, Chesney-Lind, Girls and
Status Offenses, supra note 27; MAXSON & KLEIN, supra note 36, at 12-14; Barry
Krisberg et al., The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME AND
DELINQ. 5 (1986).
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facilities had declined by 95% compared with those detained prior to
adoption of the JJDP Act.41
Although the JJDP Act prohibits states from institutionalizing
status offenders, it does not require them to appropriate funds or
develop community-based programs to meet girls' needs. Three
decades after the JJDP Act, states' failure to fund or offer gender-
appropriate services provides a continuing impetus to circumvent
DSO. 4 2 Status offenders are not a unique or discrete category of
juveniles and they share many of the same characteristics and
behavioral versatility as delinquent offenders. As a result, juvenile
courts could simply charge a status offender with a minor crime,
adjudicate her as a delinquent, and evade deinstitutionalization
strictures.43 Moreover, the suffering of sexual abuse at higher rates
than boys, pressure to conform to traditional gender roles, and high
rates of mental illness compound to create the unequal treatment of
girls. 44
Analysts warned that states could evade DSO requirements by
charging status offenders-waywardness or incorrigibility-with
simple assault and prosecuting them as delinquents. 45
Prophetically, girls' arrests for assault increased in tandem with the
41. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONCRIMINAL JUVENILES: DETENTIONS
HAVE BEEN REDUCED BUT BETTER MONITORING IS NEEDED 3 (1991).
42. See CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS 9 (2010), avaliable at http://forumfyi.org
/files/ImprovingEffectivenessofJuvenileJusticePrograms.pdf.
43. Katherine Hunt Federle & Meda Chesney-Lind, Special Issues in
Juvenile Justice: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 165 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992); Jan C.
Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: Attempts to
Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 41, 42 (1981); Kempf-Leonard & Sample, supra note 39, at 98.
44. See, e.g., THOMAS GRISso, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS
WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 36 (2004) (reporting that girls in detention have higher
rates of almost all types of mental disorders and mental health problems than
do boys); Lisa Bond-Maupin et al., Girls' Delinquency and the Justice
Implications of Intake Workers' Perspectives, 13 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 51, 52
(2002) (summarizing extra burdens of girls in the juvenile justice system);
Elizabeth Cauffman, Understanding the Female Offender, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD.
119, 124 (2008), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ815076.pdf
(reporting that girls entering the juvenile justice system have higher rates of
mental health problems than do male offenders).
45. See Eve S. Buzawa & David Hirschel, Criminalizing Assault: Do Age
and Gender Matter?, in FIGHTING FOR GIRLS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND
VIOLENCE 33, 39 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Nikki Jones eds., 2010) ("Domestic
violence cases involving children as offenders and parents as victims that were
previously processed as cases involving 'incorrigibles' or 'persons in need of
supervision' have been reclassified as assaults."); NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES,
supra note 36, at 31; Kempf-Leonard & Sample, supra note 39, at 98.
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deinstitutionalization of status offenders.46 The perceived increase
in girls' violence occurred against the backdrop of the get-tough
policies of the 1980s and early 1990s in which states changed their
laws to punish delinquents more severely, thereby reflecting a
broader shift from rehabilitative to retributive policies. 4 7 These
changes affected girls' susceptibility to arrest.48 Even though they
were not the intended targets, the punitive shift in responses to
youth violence adversely affected girls. 49
Police arrest and juvenile courts process fewer females than
their proportion of the juvenile population, especially for serious
crimes.50 Girls comprise less than one-third of all juveniles arrested
and less than one-fifth of those arrested for Violence Crime Index
offenses.5' However, over the past two decades, arrest patterns of
boys and girls for violent crimes-aggravated and simple assault-
have diverged with girls' rates either increasing more or decreasing
less than their male counterparts. 52 Police arrest youths for simple
assault at higher rates than they do for aggravated assaults, but
between 1980 and 2005, arrest rates of girls quadrupled, whereas
male arrest rates only doubled. 53 A comparison of the ratios of
46. See Chesney-Lind & Jones, supra note 6, at 4 (noting a dramatic
increase in girls' arrests and referrals to juvenile courts for "person" offenses
with a disproportionate impact on minority females); FELD, supra note 1, at 176.
47. See FELD, supra note 1, at 14; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 132-34 (2001);
ZIMRING, supra note 17, at 13-15; Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice,
supra note 17, at 1451-52; Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications
of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 9, 12-14 (2009) [hereinafter Feld, A Slower Form
of Death].
48. See Feld, supra note 4.
49. See Chesney-Lind & Belknap, supra note 29, at 206-07.
50. See Feld, supra note 4, at 246; Kempf-Leonard, supra note 2, at 488-96;
Steffensmeier et al., supra note 6, at 357; Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan,
Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of Female Offending, 22 ANN.
REV. Soc. 459, 460 (1996) ("[M]en offend at much higher rates than women for
all crime categories ... [and] [t]his gender gap in crime is greatest for serious
crime.").
51. Barry C. Feld, supra note 4, at 246 (reporting that girls constituted 29%
of all juveniles arrested and 18% of those arrested for Violent Crime Index
offenses).
52. Id. at 247 (reporting that between 1996 and 2005, boys' arrests overall
decreased by 28.8% whereas girls' arrests decreased by only 14.3%; boys' arrests
for aggravated assaults decreased by 23.4%, whereas girls' arrests declined by
only 5.4%; and boys' arrests for simple assault declined by 4.1% while girls'
arrests increased by 24%); see also Cauffman, supra note 44, at 120-22
(summarizing trends in juvenile arrest rates by gender); Paul E. Tracy et al.,
Gender Differences in Delinquency and Juvenile Justice Processing: Evidence
from National Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 183-94 (2009) (reporting and
comparing arrest data for male and female juveniles between 1980 and 2006).
53. Feld, supra note 4, at 250; Mike Males, Have "Girls Gone Wild?", in
FIGHTING FOR GIRLS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER AND VIOLENCE 13, 26-27
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arrests for simple assault to aggravated assault reported that by
2005, police arrested girls almost six times as often for simple
assault, compared with only three times as often for boys.54 "[B]y all
the measures-arrests, arrest rates, and ratios of simple to
aggravated assaults-the increase in girls' arrests for simple
assaults and boys' decrease in arrests for aggravated assaults
constitute the most significant change in youth violence over the
decades."55  Police exercise considerable discretion when they
classify conduct as a status offense-incorrigible or unruly
behavior-or as an assault.56  Analysts contend that more
aggressive policing of minor crimes and disorder (zero tolerance), a
lower threshold to charge youths with minor offenses, and more
active policing in private settings have created a misleading
perception of a youth crime wave, especially among girls.57
Policies of mandatory arrests for domestic violence have
increased girls' vulnerability to arrest for intra-family altercations.5 8
(Meda Chesney-Lind & Nikke Jones eds., 2010) (attributing the increase in
girls' arrests for simple assaults to increased policing of workplace, school, and
domestic violence).
54. Feld, supra note 4, at 250; Tracy et al., supra note 52, at 193 tbl.4
(reporting that police arrested a larger proportion of girls for simple assault
than there were total arrests of boys).
55. Feld, supra note 4, at 250.
56. Id. at 252.
57. Id. at 250-53; see also HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 131-33 (2006);
Steffensmeier & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 52-54 (arguing that girls commit
less serious crimes, but a net-widening criminalization of less serious "violence,"
coupled with more intrusive policing in private settings and less tolerance
toward juvenile girls increases their arrest-proneness); ZIMRING, supra note 17,
at 37-40; Steffensmeier et al., supra note 6, at 387-90 (attributing the
perceived increase in girls' arrests for violence to changes in police responses to
domestic violence); Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 45, at 36 (arguing that
statutes mandating more aggressive arrests and decreased police discretion
have increased juvenile girls' likelihood of arrest for domestic assault); Chesney-
Lind & Belknap, supra note 29, at 206 ("[Measures of girls' violent crime that
are less susceptible to change in policing practices fail to reflect the trends
shown in the arrest data."); Males, supra note 53, at 26-27 (attributing the
increase in girls' arrests to "new law enforcement initiatives authorized by
stronger laws beginning in the 1980s to make arrests for street, school,
workplace, and (especially) domestic violence in cases that once brought
warnings or informal discipline").
58. See SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS: THE PARADOX OF WOMEN'S
VIOLENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS 2 (2005); Bond-Maupin et al., supra note 44, at 67-
68 (attributing girls' arrests to power struggles and fights with parents at
home); Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 45, at 33 (noting expansion of domestic
violence statutes to encompass other relationships in addition to female victims
of spousal partner violence); Meda Chesney-Lind, Criminalizing Victimization:
The Unintended Consequences of Pro-Arrest Policies for Girls and Women, 2
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 81, 81-90 (2002); Chesney-Lind & Belknap, supra
note 29, at 207 (attributing perceived increase in girls' arrests for violence to
"changes in police practices"); Ravoira & Patino, supra note 5 (attributing
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Girls' violence is much more likely to involve fights with parents or
siblings than is boys' violence, and girls' share of arrests for
domestic assaults has increased substantially. 5 9 The confluence of
heightened attention to family violence and limited authority to
incarcerate status offenders encouraged police to respond to the
same underlying behavior as delinquency and arrest girls for
assault rather than incorrigibility.60  Probation officers describe
most girls' assault cases as either a fight with a parent at home or
between girls at school.61 Regardless of who starts a domestic clash,
police find it easier and more efficient to arrest the youth as the
offender, especially if a parent cares for other children in the
home.62 Although girls comprise only about one-seventh of all
delinquents in institutions, between 1997 and 2003 the simple
assault category constituted the largest proportion of any offense for
disparate treatment of girls to "policies and practices includ[ing] labeling family
disputes as domestic violence [and] subjecting girls to police practices specific to
the enforcement of domestic violence laws"); Steffensmeier et al., supra note 6,
at 357 (arguing that an increase in arrests of girls for violence is largely a by-
product of net-widening enforcement policies, like broader definitions of youth
violence and greater surveillance of girls that have escalated the arrest-
proneness of adolescent girls today relative to girls in prior decades and relative
to boys).
59. See AM. BAR AsS'N & NAT'L BAR ASS'N, supra note 30, at 3 (attributing
the growth in girls' arrests for assault to "re-labeling of girls' family conflicts as
violent offenses, the changes in police practices regarding domestic violence and
aggressive behavior, [and] the gender bias in the processing of misdemeanor
cases"); BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INFO. & ANALYSIS, REPORT ON ARRESTS FOR
DOMESTIc VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1998, at 17 (1999); Chesney-Lind &
Belknap, supra note 29, at 206 (noting that girls' arrests for violent offenses
tended to be "family centered" and involved an altercation between a girl and
her mother); Feld, supra note 4, at 254.
60. See, e.g., Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses, supra note 27, at
144-65; Chesney-Lind & Belknap, supra note 29, at 206; Feld, supra note 4, at
254.
61. See, e.g., Emily Gaarder et al., Criers, Liars, and Manipulators:
Probation Officers' Views of Girls, 21 JuST. Q. 547, 564-66 (2004).
62. See Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 45, at 38 (noting that parents'
"right" to use "reasonable" corporal punishment to discipline children skews
police likelihood to "use domestic violence statutes as a powerful tool to uphold
and support parental authority"); Gaarder et al., supra note 61, at 565 (noting
that police remove children for fights started by parents because "[i]f you arrest
the parents, than [sic] you have to shelter the kids .. . . So the police just make
the kids go away and the numbers of kids being referred to the juvenile court
for assaulting their parents .. . have just been increasing tremendously because
of that political change"); Ravoira & Patino, supra note 5, at 166 ("If the adult is
arrested, there is no place to take other children, and thus it is more expedient
to arrest the adolescent female."). See generally MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & LISA
PASKO, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME (2d ed. 2004)
(examining women and girl offenders in an attempt to understand the increase
in their incarceration rates).
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which states confined girls, and that share has increased steadily.63
Ironically, girls became the unintended victims of mandatory arrest
policies enacted to prevent abusive males from attacking their
female partners.64
B. Police Interrogation of Juveniles
For decades prior to Miranda, the Court admonished trial
judges to closely examine how youthfulness affected the
voluntariness of confessions. The Court in Haley v. Ohio65 found a
fifteen-year-old boy's confession involuntary because of his youth
and inexperience.66 The Court in Gallegos v. Colorado67 found age
and immaturity rendered a fourteen-year-old boy's confession
involuntary.68  The Court in In re Gault69 reiterated that
youthfulness could adversely affect the voluntariness of juveniles'
statements.70 Gault based most delinquents' procedural rights on
the. Fourteenth Amendment due process clause-notice, hearing,
counsel, and cross-examination.7 ' It relied explicitly on the Fifth
Amendment to protect youths' right against self-incrimination in
delinquency proceedings.72  Gault recognized that the Fifth
Amendment promotes accurate fact-finding and maintains the
63. Meda Chesney-Lind, Jailing "Bad" Girls: Girls' Violence and Trends in
Female Incarceration, in FIGHTING FOR GIRLS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER
AND VIOLENCE 57, 61 (Meda Chesney-Lind & Nikki Jones eds., 2010) (noting
that juvenile courts held over half of girls (51.8%) but less than one-third of
boys (21.2%) in pretrial detention for simple assaults); Feld, supra note 4, at
259 tbl.4.
64. MILLER, supra note 58, at 7-9; see Buzawa & Hirschel, supra note 45, at
41-49 (analyzing arrest patterns in domestic assaults and reporting that female
juveniles have the greatest likelihood of arrest compared with juvenile or adult
males or adult females).
65. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
66. Id. at 599-600 ("That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. . . . [W]e cannot believe
that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest.").
67. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
68. Id. at 54 ("[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated ... is not
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding.").
69. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
70. Id. at 52; see also Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1137 (1980)
(arguing that Gault granted juveniles greater required protection because "their
immaturity and greater vulnerability place them at a greater disadvantage in
their dealings with the police").
71. Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note
13, at 154-57 (analyzing constitutional bases for the Court's juvenile due
process decisions).
72. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50 (extending the Fifth Amendment privilege to
delinquency proceedings and holding that "[iut would be entirely unrealistic to
carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground
that these cannot lead to 'criminal' involvement").
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adversarial balance between the individual and the State.73 Gault
and subsequent due process decisions fostered a procedural and
substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal courts.74
Despite the Court's recognition of the vulnerability of youth,
Fare v. Michael C.75 held that the "totality of the circumstances" test
used to evaluate adults' waivers of Miranda rights governed
juveniles' waivers as well.76 The Court reasoned that Miranda
provided an objective basis to evaluate waivers. 77 It denied that
youths' developmental differences dictated special procedural
protections and required children to assert their rights clearly. 78
Miranda provided that if police question a suspect who is in
custody-arrested or "deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way"-they must administer a warning.79 The Court in
J.D.B. v. North Carolinaso concluded that a suspect's age was an
73. Id. at 47. The Court recognized that one function of the Fifth
Amendment was "to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably
trustworthy ... [and] reliable expressions of the truth." Id. The Court
emphasized that another purpose of the privilege was "to prevent the State,
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and
will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to
decide whether to assist the [S]tate in securing his conviction." Id.
74. Subsequent decisions further criminalized delinquency proceedings.
See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1975) (positing a functional
equivalence of criminal and delinquency trials); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (denying delinquents the right to a jury trial); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (requiring states to prove delinquents' guilt
by the criminal law's standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). However,
Gault and Winship provided the impetus to transform the juvenile court from a
social welfare agency into a scaled-down criminal court. Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice, supra note 13, at 161-62; see FELD, supra note 1, at 106-07;
see also Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 13, at 829-31.
75. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
76. Id. at 725 (holding that a request for a probation officer did not invoke
Miranda's privilege against self-incrimination or right to counsel); see also
Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to
Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of
Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 431, 449 (2006) (explaining that the Court
decided Michael C. as a Miranda case rather than as a juvenile interrogation
case).
77. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 724-25.
78. See id. at 723-24 (deciding that a juvenile's request to see a trusted
adult is not an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); see also Francis Barry
McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 461 (1981); Irene Merker
Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal
for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 686-91 (1980).
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
80. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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objective fact that would affect whether a young person would feel
restrained in Miranda's custody analysis.8'
Most state courts use Michael C.'s totality framework for
juveniles. 82 When judges evaluate Miranda waivers, they consider
offender features-age, education, I.Q., or prior police contacts-and
the interrogation context: location, methods, and length of
questioning. 83 No one factor controls outcomes and appellate courts
defer to trial judges' discretion.84 Although some states require a
parent to be present when police question his or her child,85 most
commentators question the value of a parent's participation.86
81. Id. at 2403 ("[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to
go. We think it clear that courts can account for that reality.").
82. King, supra note 76, at 456; Kimberly Larson, Improving the "Kangaroo
Courts": A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles' Waiver of Miranda, 48
VILL. L. REV. 629, 645 & n.91, 646 (2003) (summarizing the majority of states'
use of the "totality of circumstances" test and the factors they consider).
83. See, e.g., Michael C., 442 U.S. at 727; West v. United States, 399 F.2d
467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 11 (2010). Trial judges failed to
recognize juveniles' claims that waivers were involuntary or confessions coerced
even when DNA evidence subsequently exonerated them. Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88-91 (2008). In practice, judges
invalidate waivers or exclude confessions only under the most egregious
circumstances. FELD, supra note 1, at 118; Barry C. Feld, Juveniles'
Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Police and
Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 32 n.18 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles'
Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights] (describing appellate decisions); Barry
C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right
to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 105, 113 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights] (summarizing factors); Barry C. Feld,
Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 224 n.19 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Police
Interrogation of Juveniles] (describing appellate courts' deference to trial
judges).
85. King, supra note 76, at 451-52; see Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal
Rights, supra note 84, at 116-18; Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the
Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1287 n.65 (2004) (listing the states with parental presence
requirements); see, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312-13 (Kan. 1998)
(protecting youths younger than fourteen); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449
N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (requiring a parent or an appropriate adult);
State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114, 1117 (N.J. 2000) (requiring a parent,
especially for younger juveniles, whenever possible); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937,
940 (Vt. 1982) (holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a youth
"must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult").
86. See, e.g., Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 84, at 117-
18 (questioning whether parents will understand rights, provide legal advice, or
mitigate coercive influences); Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn't Do It: Protecting
the Rights of Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355,
374-77 (2002). See generally THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS:
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Minnesota rejects a parental presence requirement and gauges
juveniles' Miranda waivers under the totality of the
circumstances.87
The Court's "children-are-different" jurisprudence bears on
youths' vulnerability during questioning.88 Roper v. Simmons8 9
barred states from executing offenders for a murder committed
before the age of eighteen.90 Graham v. Florida1 banned life
without parole sentences for nonhomicide crimes committed by
juveniles.92 Miller v. Alabama93 and Jackson v. Hobbs94 banned
mandatory life sentences without parole for youths who commit
murder.95  In all three decisions, the Court emphasized that
juveniles' immature judgment and limited self-control caused them
to act impulsively and without full appreciation of consequences and
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 180-81 (1981) (reporting that parents
may pressure children to tell the truth and confess); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A.
Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard
Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from
Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127,
153-55 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (endorsing a parental presence
requirement even though interrogators reduce parents' role to passive
observer).
87. See, e.g., State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 597 (Minn. 2005) (noting
that repeated request for a parent before and after a Miranda warning may
render a waiver involuntary); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980);
State v. Loyd, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1973).
88. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
89. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
90. Id. at 569. Roper attributed juveniles' reduced culpability to three
factors. First, "a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults . . . . These qualities often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions." Id. Second, "juveniles
are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure." Id. Third, "the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory, less fixed." Id. at 570. See generally Feld, Responsibility,
Proportionality, and Sentencing, supra note 18 (analyzing the juvenile death
penalty cases leaing up to the Roper decision); Feld, A Slower Form of Death,
supra note 47 (analyzing the Court's three diminished responsibility
rationales); Feld, Youth Discount, supra note 18 (examining the Court's
reasoning in Roper).
91. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
92. Id. at 68 ("[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example,
parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.").
93. 132 S. Ct. 2455.
94. Id. (case decided in the same Supreme Court decision as Miller v.
Alabama).
95. Id. at 2464. See generally Feld, Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing, supra note 18 (analyzing sentencing policy implications of the
Court's children are different jurisprudence).
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reduced their culpability.96 Greater susceptibility to peer influences
also diminished juveniles' criminal responsibility. 97  These
developmental traits-immaturity, impulsivity, and susceptibility to
social influences-heighten youths' vulnerability in the
interrogation room.
Developmental psychologists distinguish between cognitive
ability and maturity of judgment. Most youths sixteen years of age
or older exhibit cognitive abilities comparable to adults, but mature
judgment and adult-like, decision-making competence does not fully
emerge until their twenties.98  By mid-adolescence, they can
distinguish right from wrong and reason similarly to adults.99 But
the ability to make good choices in a laboratory differs from the
ability to make adult-like decisions under stressful conditions with
incomplete information.100 The MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justicelo1
distinguishes between cognitive ability and maturity of judgment-
risk assessment, temporal orientation, capacity for self-regulation,
96. Graham, 560 U.S. at 89; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
97. Graham, 560 U.S. at 92; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
98. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L.
REV. 799, 811-17 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth]
("Psycho-social development proceeds more slowly than cognitive
development."); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011-14, 1016-17 (2003)
[hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason].
99. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the
Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful
Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389, 407-09 (1999); see also SCOTT &
STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 164 (comparing cognitive competence of
adolescents and adults); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature
Than Adults? Minors' Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the
Alleged APA "Flip-Flop," 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 584 (2009) (noting that the
American Psychological Association affirmed the maturity of adolescent girls to
make abortion decisions without parental assistance).
100. See L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 417, 423 (2000)
(noting that adolescents "exhibit considerably poorer cognitive performance
under circumstances involving everyday stress and time-limited situations than
under optimal test conditions"); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychological Factors in Adolescent
Decision-Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 251 (1996); see also Steinberg et
al., supra note 99, at 586 (reporting that "adolescents and adults are not of
equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities ... such as impulse
control and resistance to peer influence").
101. MAcARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. &
JUVENILE JUSTICE, ISSUE BRIEF 3: LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE 2,
available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf; see also
ScoTT & STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 160-65; Feld, A Slower Form of Death,
supra note 47, at 31-32 (summarizing the Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice research network).
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and susceptibility to social influences-which affects youths'
vulnerability during interrogation. 102
1. Immature Judgment and Risk Perception
Youths differ from adults in time perspective, risk perception,
and appreciation of future consequences.10 3 Adolescents' poorer
decisions reflect differences in knowledge, experience, and impulse
control.104 Adolescents underestimate risks, use shorter time
frames, and focus on gains rather than losses.O5 Sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old youths are more present oriented and perceive
fewer risks than either younger or older subjects.106  Youths'
appetite for risk peaks at those ages, and they regard not engaging
in risky behaviors differently than do adults.107
102. MAcARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 101.
103. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 98, at 813 ("The
psycho-social factors most relevant to differences in judgment include: (a) peer
orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal
perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management .... [T]hese developmental
factors influence adolescent values and preferences that drive the cost-benefit
calculus in the making of choices.").
104. See id. at 814 ("Future orientation, the capacity and inclination to
project events into the future, may also influence judgment, since it will affect
the extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their
actions in making choices."); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent
Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 227 (1995);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160-61 (1997).
105. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 19 (1992); William
Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT
RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Thomas Grisso,
What We Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 84. at
139, 160-62
106. See Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason, supra note 98, at 1012.
107. Emotions affect decision making and researchers distinguish between
choices made under conditions of cold and hot cognition or states of arousal. See
Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 115, 119 (2007) ("[Ajdolescents are much less capable
of making sound decisions when under stressful conditions or when peer
pressure is strong."); Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development,
and Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61(2001) ("Cold cognition refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion
and/or arousal, whereas hot cognition refers to thinking under conditions of
strong feelings or high arousal."); Steinberg et al., supra note 99, at 592; see also
Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1643-50 (1992); Spear, supra note 100, at 421-23, 428-29.
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2. Neuroscience: Adolescents' Judgment and Impulse Control
Neuroscientists attribute differences in adolescent and adult
thought and behavior to brain maturation.108 The prefrontal cortex
("PFC") of the frontal lobe regulates executive functions such as
abstract thinking, strategic planning, and impulse control-skills
necessary to exercise legal rights. 109 The amygdala (the limbic
system) controls emotional and instinctual behavior-the fight-or-
flight response-and in stressful situations, adolescents rely more
heavily on the amygdala and less heavily on the PFC than do
adults.110 Novel circumstances and emotional arousal challenge
youths' ability to exercise self-control."' Graham noted that youths'
diminished judgment, compromised risk-calculus, and short-term
108. See Dahl, supra note 107, at 69 ("Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex]
that underpin higher cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing
functional changes that continue well into late adolescence/adulthood.");
Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During
Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826-29 (2001)
(discussing significant changes in brain structure prior to adulthood); Spear,
supra note 100, at 438 ("[T]he adolescent brain is a brain in flux, undergoing
numerous regressive and progressive changes in mesocorticolimbic regions.").
See generally Barry C. Feld et al., Adolescent Competence and Culpability:
Implications of Neuroscience for Juvenile Justice Administration, in A PRIMER
ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 179 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L.
Roskies, eds. 2013).
109. See Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the
Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 323 (2006) ("The
frontal cortex has been shown to play a major role in the performance of
executive functions including short term or working memory, motor set and
planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision making."); Tomis Paus et
al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and Adolescents: In
Vivo Study, 283 SCI. 1908, 1908-10 (1999).
110. See David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children's Mental Health
and the Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 15 (2003) ("Adolescents tend to process emotionally
charged decisions in the limbic system, the part of the brain charged with
instinctive (and often impulsive) reactions. Most adults use more of their
frontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for reasoned and thoughtful
responses."); Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of
Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 198 (1999).
111. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 98, at 816,
(summarizing the interaction between the PFC-the executive functions-and
the limbic system-impulsive behavior: "At puberty, changes in the limbic
system-a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to take
more risks; these changes may also contribute to increased emotionality and
vulnerability to stress. At the same time, patterns of development in the
prefrontal cortex, which is active during the performance of complicated tasks
involving planning and decisionmaking, suggest that these higher-order
cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle adolescence.").
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perspective impaired defense representation and ability to exercise
rights.112
3. Adolescents' Competence to Exercise Rights
Despite the Court's repeated references to developmental
differences, most states use adult legal standards to gauge juveniles'
Miranda waivers. If youths differ from adults in their ability to
understand Miranda, to exercise rights, or to respond to social
influences, then the law may hold them to a standard that few can
meet. Some juveniles simply do not understand the words of
Miranda warnings.113 The vocabulary, concepts, and reading levels
required to understand Miranda may exceed the ability of many
adolescents.114 The concept of a right and the meaning of appointed
require a high school education and may render Miranda
unintelligible to many juveniles. 15 Juveniles do not fully appreciate
the function or importance of rights or view them as an
entitlement,1 6 but instead regard them as a privilege that
authorities may withdraw. 17
112. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010) ("Difficulty in weighing long-
term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust
defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can
lead to poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense.").
113. See, e.g., Grisso, supra note 70, at 1143-44; Richard Rogers et al., An
Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 181 (2007).
114. See Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of
Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 63, 72-85 (2008)
[hereinafter Rogers, Comprehensibility and Context]; see also Richard Rogers et
al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A
Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 135 (2008)
(noting that key words and concepts of a warning require at least a tenth-grade
level of education); Richard Rogers, A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous
Thing ... Emerging Miranda Research and Professional Roles for Psychologists,
63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 779 (2008).
115. See Rogers, Comprehensibility and Context, supra note 114, at 74 tbl.3,
76 tbl.4. Many juveniles cannot define critical words used in Miranda
warnings. See Rona Abramovitch et al., Young People's Understanding and
Assertion of Their Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel, 37 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10-11 (1995); Rona Abramovitch et al., Young Persons'
Comprehension of Waivers in Criminal Proceedings, 35 CANADIAN J.
CRIMINOLOGY 309, 320 (1993) (arguing that most juveniles do not have sufficient
understanding to competently waive Miranda); Rogers, Comprehensibility and
Context, supra note 114, at 72-75; Jodi Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of
Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas,
Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261-
64 (2005) (finding that youths fifteen years of age and younger had poorer
understanding and were more likely to waive rights and confess than older
youths). See generally ALAN GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI E. SEVIN GOLDSTEIN,
EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS (2010).
116. See GRISSO, supra note 86, at 130; Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 11 (1997)
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Thomas Grisso has studied juveniles' ability to exercise
Miranda rights for more than three decades and reports that many
youths simply do not understand the warning. 118 Half of juveniles
(55.3%), as contrasted with less than one-quarter of adults (23.1%),
misunderstood at least one of the warnings and only one-fifth
(20.9%) of juveniles, as compared with almost half (42.3%) of adults,
understood the entire warning. 119 Although sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds understood Miranda comparably with adults, substantial
numbers of both groups misunderstood some elements.120 Younger
teens consistently misunderstood Miranda more than youths in
their mid-teens. 121
[hereinafter Grisso, Adolescents as Trial Defendants] (distinguishing between
understanding words of warning and appreciating the functions of the rights
that a warning conveys); Larson, supra note 82, at 649-53 (reviewing social
psychological research concerning juveniles' limited understanding of the
concept of "rights" as entitlements to be exercised).
117. See GRISSO, supra note 86, at 130; Grisso, Adolescents as Trial
Defendants, supra note 116, at 10-11 ("[A] larger proportion of delinquent
youths bring to the defendant role an incomplete comprehension of the concept
and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial legal proceedings."); Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: New Questions for an Era of
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: RETHINKING,
ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 23, 29-30 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002).
118. See GRISSO, supra note 86, at 106-07; Grisso, Adolescents as Trial
Defendants, supra note 116, at 11 (noting adolescents' difficulty in grasping the
concept of a right as an entitlement); Grisso, supra note 70, at 1152-54; Thomas
Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
333, 335 (2003) [hereinafter Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial].
See Generally THOMAS GRISSO, INSTRUMENTS FOR ASSESSING UNDERSTANDING &
APPRECIATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS (1998) (providing tests to assess an
examinee's comprehension of Miranda warnings).
119. Grisso, supra note 70, at 1152-54.
120. Grisso, Adolescents as Trial Defendants, supra note 116, at 10-14. Age-
related improvements in comprehension appear in other studies. See Kassin et
al., supra note 84, at 8 ("[T]he understanding of adolescents ages 15-17 with
near-average levels of verbal intelligence tends not to have been inferior to that
of adults."); Jodi Viljoen & Ronald Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation
Rights and Adjudicative Competence in Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive
Development, Attorney Contact, and Psychological Symptoms, 29 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 723, 736 (2005) (noting that intellectual and verbal abilities increased
with age, which indicates that "young adolescents may not yet have acquired
the cognitive abilities necessary to adequately understand and participate in
legal proceedings").
121. See Grisso, supra note 70, at 1160 (reporting that the majority of
juveniles younger than fifteen years of age "failed to meet both the absolute and
relative (adult norm) standards for comprehension . .. [and] misunderstood at
least one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with adults,
demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension of the nature and significance
of the Miranda rights"); Jodi Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and
Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A Comparison of
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Even youths who understand Miranda's words may not be
competent to exercise rights. Competence to stand trial requires a
person to understand proceedings, make rational decisions, and
assist counsel.122  Developmental limitations impair youths'
understanding, rationality, and ability to assist counsel in the same
ways that mental illness or retardation renders adults
incompetent.123 Many younger juveniles are as severely impaired as
adults found incompetent to stand trial. 124
Roper and Graham concluded that youths' greater susceptibility
to social influences diminished their responsibility. 125 Miranda
characterized custodial interrogation as inherently compelling
because police dominate the setting, control information, and create
psychological pressures to comply.126  Adults expect youths to
answer questions posed by authorities-parents, teachers, and
police-and youths may acquiesce more readily to suggestions.127
Youths seek interviewers' approval and respond more readily to
Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 1, 9 (2007) (reporting substantially
impaired understanding by youths younger than sixteen).
122. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Analysts question whether juveniles possess
these competencies. See Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative
Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 73, 86-89; Grisso et al.,
Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 118, at 335.
123. See Grisso, Adolescents as Trial Defendants, supra note 116, at 20-21;
Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern
Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 353, 374-78 (2001); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice
Policy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 793, 795-98 (2005).
124. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 122, at 87-88; Grisso et al., Juveniles'
Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 118, at 356; Redding & Frost, supra
note 123, at 374-78.
125. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
126. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455-58 (1966). See generally
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK (2003) (examining advances in psychological research relevant to
interrogations and confessions).
127. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 1005 (2004) (finding
that juveniles' "eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity,
immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-
making," puts them at greater risk to falsely confess); Kassin et al., supra note
84, at 8 ("[Y]outh under age 15 . .. are more likely to believe that they should
waive their rights and tell what they have done, partly because they are still
young enough to believe that they should never disobey authority."); Krishna K.
Singh & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Interrogative Suggestibility Among Adolescent
Boys and Its Relationship with Intelligence, Memory, and Cognitive Set, 15 J.
ADOLESCENCE 155, 160 (1992).
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negative pressure.128  Youths may impulsively provide false
confessions to escape the stress of a lengthy interrogation.129
Although the Court requires suspects to invoke Miranda clearly
and unambiguously,130 some groups-juveniles, females, or racial
minorities-may assert rights more tentatively to avoid conflict with
those in power.11 The Court in Davis v. United States132 recognized
that requiring a clear invocation of rights could prove problematic
for some suspects.133 Even older youths who understand Miranda
may feel more constrained by power differentials and less able to
assert rights effectively.' 34
C. Police Interrogation Practices
The Miranda Court did not have direct evidence or empirical
studies of how police questioned suspects.135 It could not assess how
psychological tactics like isolation, confrontation, or minimization
affected suspects' willingness to talk.136 The Court used training
manuals as a proxy,13 7 and quoted extensively from Fred E. Inbau
128. See F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to
Falsely Incriminate Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007);
Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions
Regarding Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 757, 764 (2007) ("Psychologically coercive strategies that contribute to
interrogative suggestibility play on young suspects' eagerness to please, firm
trust of people in authority, lack of self-confidence, increased desire to protect
friends/relatives and to impress peers, and increased desire to leave the
interrogation sooner." (citations omitted)); G. Richardson et al., Interrogative
Suggestibility in an Adolescent Forensic Population, 18 J. ADOLESCENCE 211,
215 (1995).
129. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 127; Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al.,
Testimony and Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions About Maturity and
Morality, 61 AM. PYSCHOLOGIST 286, 292 (2006).
130. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010); Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
131. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of
Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318 (1993).
132. 512 U.S. 452.
133. Id. at 460 ("[R]equiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might
disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear, intimidation, lack of
linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not clearly articulate their
right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.").
134. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 58.
135. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("Interrogation still
takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a
gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.").
136. See id. ("[T]he modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented."). See generally Saul M. Kassin
& Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the
Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. ScI. PUB. INT. 33, 53-56 (2004).
137. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55; see also Richard A. Leo & Welsh S.
White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with
the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 (1999); Charles D.
Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1526 (2008)
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and John E. Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions as a
surrogate for interrogation practices. 138 The Reid Method remains
the foremost training program and underlies most contemporary
interrogation practice and research. 139
Isolating a suspect under the Reid Method eliminates social
supports and psychological tactics to overcome resistance and create
the compulsive pressures of custodial interrogation.140 Psychologists
describe the Reid Method's manipulations as maximization and
minimization techniques.141 Maximization techniques "convey the
interrogator's rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty and that all
denials will fail. Such tactics include making an accusation,
overriding objections, and citing evidence, real or manufactured, to
shift the suspect's mental state from confident to hopeless."142
Minimization techniques "provide the suspect with moraljustification and face-saving excuses for having committed the crime
in question. Using this approach, the interrogator offers sympathy
[hereinafter Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda]. See generally Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 119 n.48 (1998)
[hereinafter Weisselberg, Saving Miranda] (describing the research conducted
by the Supreme Court librarian to determine the representativeness of
interrogation manuals).
138. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55; see also id. at 449 n.9 ("The methods
described in Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions ... have
had rather extensive use among law enforcement agencies.").
139. See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 111-12 (2008). Reid
instructors have trained more than 500,000 investigators. Interviewing &
Interrogation, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
http://www.reid.com/training-programs/interviewoverview
.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014). And the Reid Method is the most widely
taught interrogation technique in North America. Lesley King & Brent Snook,
Peering Inside a Canadian Interrogation Room: An Examination of the Reid
Model of Interrogation, Influence Tactics, and Coercive Strategies, 36 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 674, 674 (2009). The Reid Method's ubiquity provides a
framework for most contemporary research. See, e.g., GUDJONSSON, supra note
126, at 10-21; Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra
note 84, at 50-51; King & Snook, supra at 675-80.
140. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55; see also GUDJONSSON, supra note 126, at
10 ("[Inbau and Reid] introduced a nine-step method aimed at breaking down
the resistance of reluctant suspects and making them confess, referred to as the
'Reid Technique."'); Id. at 30-31 ("Social isolation . . . can powerfully influence
the decision-making of suspects and the reliability of their statements."); Kassin
et al., supra note 84, at 15 ("[T]he goal of interrogation is to alter a suspect's
decision making by increasing the anxiety associated with denial and reducing
the anxiety associated with confession."); Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of
Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 222 (1997) [hereinafter Kassin,
The Psychology of Confession Evidence] ("Against the backdrop of a physical
environment that promotes feelings of social isolation, sensory deprivation, and
a lack of control, Inbau et al. (1986) described in vivid detail a nine-step
procedure designed to overcome the resistance of reluctant suspects.").
141. See Kassin et al., supra note 84, at 12 (discussing maximization and
minimization techniques used in police interrogations).
142. Id.
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and understanding ... [and] normalizes and minimizes the
crime." 143
The Reid Method claims that verbal and nonverbal cues-
behavioral symptom analysis-enable interrogators to distinguish
between guilty and innocent suspects and to question them
accordingly. 144 It prescribes a nine-step sequence to increase stress,
weaken resistance, provide face-saving rationales, and encourage
confessions. 145 The Reid Method does not modify interrogation
tactics to accommodate developmental differences;146 instead, it
teaches police that the "principles . . . discussed with respect to
adult suspects are just as applicable the younger ones."147 Its
training does not distinguish between male and female suspects and
employs the same tactics with both.
Interrogation training in England and Wales prescribed
investigative interviews that are designed to elicit information
143. Id. at 14.
144. See Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 128, at 760. Begining with a
"Behavioral Analysis Interview," police decide if an interviewee is a "prime
suspect" by observing whether the interviewee exhibits verbal and nonverbal
deceptive behaviors such as "gaze aversion, unnatural body postures," "touching
and scratching," "lack of confidence, and delays in response." Id. Psychologists
question the theoretical underpinnings and scientific validity of the Reid
Method. See id. at 671-72; see also GUDJONSSON, supra note 126, at 12 ("Inbau
and [Reid] have not published any data or studies on their observations. In
other words, they have not collected any empirical data to scientifically validate
their theory and techniques.").
145. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 126, at 10-21; id. at 11 (presenting the
bases of the Reid Method: "[b]reaking down denials and resistance" and
"[i]ncreasing the suspect's desire to confess"); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212-16 (4th ed. 2004); LEO, POLICE
INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 119 ("[P]sychological interrogation ... is a
strategic, multistage, goal-directed, stress-driven exercise in persuasion and
deception, one designed to produce a very specific set of psychological effects
and reactions in order to move the suspect from denial to admission."); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 452 (1987)
(arguing that the tensions police create in the custodial environment are
designed to overcome a suspect's reluctance to talk).
146. See Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 128, at 761; Owen-Kostelnik et al.,
supra note 129, at 290; N. Dickon Reppucci et al., Custodial Interrogation of
Juveniles: Results of a National Survey of Police, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 67, 69 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds.,
2010).
147. INBAU ET AL., supra note 145, at 298. Reid-trained police view
adolescents to be as competent as adults and use similar tactics with both. See
Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 128, at 761; see also Jessica 0. Kostelnik & N.
Dickon Reppucci, Reid Training and Sensitivity to Developmental Maturity in
Interrogation: Results from a National Survey of Police, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 361,
370-74 (2009) (reporting that Reid-trained police use the same techniques with
juvenille offenders and adults).
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rather than to secure a confession.148 The Police and Criminal
Evidence Act of 1984 (the "PACE Act") required police to record
interrogations.149 Police, psychologists, and lawyers collaborated to
develop the PEACE approach to investigative interviewing. 150 The
PEACE acronym stands for "Planning and Preparation," "Engage
and Explain," "Account," "Closure," and "Evaluate." The PEACE
method is an information-gathering method of questioning that is
less confrontational or accusatory than the Reid Method.151
Whereas the Reid Method equates juveniles and adults, PEACE
148. See Ray Bull & Becky Milne, Attempts to Improve the Police
Interviewing of Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT
181, 185-86 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) [hereinafter Bull & Milne, Attempts
to Improve]; Kassin et al., supra note 84, at 28. See generally Ray Bull &
Stavroula Soukara, Four Studies of What Really Happens in Police Interviews,
in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 146, at 81, 82-83;
REBECCA MILNE & RAY BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: PSYCHOLOGY AND
PRACTICE 158 (1999) [hereinafter MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING].
149. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 60 (Eng.); see
GUDJONSSON, supra note 126, at 22 ("Since 1991 there has been mandatory
tape-recording [in England and Wales] of any person suspected of an indictable
offence who is interviewed under caution." (citation omitted)); Milne & Bull,
Investigative Interviewing, supra note 148, at 73-76; Bull & Soukara, supra
note 148, at 81-82.
150. MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 148, at 159;
Ray Bull, Preface to INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, at vii-viii (Ray Bull, ed.,
2014) (summarizing elements of PEACE approach). The PEACE approach
encourages officers to establish rapport, to obtain a free narrative, to use open
rather than leading questions, and then to provide meaningful closure by
summarizing information and answering any questions. See MILNE & BULL,
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 148, at 108; Kassin et al., supra note
84, at 28. The acronym PEACE-"Planning and Preparation," "Engage and
Explain," "Account," "Closure," and "Evaluate"-describes the five components
of the British interview approach. Investigators conduct interviews as a search
for truth rather than as a quest for a confession, and the approach prohibits the
use of trickery. See Bull & Soukara, supra note 148, at 81-83; S. Soukara et al.,
What Really Happens in Police Interviews of Suspects? Tactics and Confessions,
15 Psychol. Crime & L. 493, 500 (2009).
151. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 126, at 53; see also MILNE & BULL,
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 148, at 157-67 (describing the goal of
the interview as to gather as much information as possible to create an accurate
factual picture, rather than simply to elicit a confession). Advocates of the
PEACE approach criticize the Reid Method as "contrary to the principles of
good investigative interviewing." Bull & Milne, Attempts to Improve, supra note
148, at 182. Reid tactics seek to control and manipulate the suspect to extract a
confession. See id. The accusatorial approach is guilt-presumptive and
confrontational and attempts to elicit statements that confirm police hypotheses
about the suspect's guilt. See id. By contrast, the information-gathering
method emphasizes rapport between the questioner and suspect and seeks the
suspect's version of events. See MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING,
supra note 148, at 157-58; Bull & Soukara, supra note 148, at 84-87.
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recognizes youths' vulnerabilities and requires an appropriate adult
to attend a juvenile's interview.152
Interrogation training in Minnesota reflects both the Reid
Method and the PEACE elements. The Minnesota Supreme Court
in State v. Scales153 required police to record all custodial
interrogations.15 4 Because questioning took place "on the record,"
police trainers developed less confrontational strategies to interview
suspects.155  Training protocols advocate the use of open-ended
questions to obtain a free narrative and to elicit information rather
than to conduct a "recorded interview with the goal of getting a
confession."156
D. Police Interrogation: Empirical Research
Despite the critical role of interrogation in justice
administration, criminologists and legal scholars have conducted
remarkably few empirical studies of how police question suspects.157
Post-Miranda research examined whether police warned suspects
152. See COLIN CLARKE & REBECCA MILNE, NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE
PEACE INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING COURSE 32 (2001); see also MILNE & BULL,
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 148, at 77 (discussing youths'
vulnerabilities during police questioning). See generally Ray Bull, The
Investigative Interviewing of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses:
Psychological Research and Working/Professional Practice, 15 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (2010) (explaining how the PEACE method uses
different strategies for children than for adults).
153. 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
154. Id. at 592.
155. See Neil Nelson, Strategies for the Recorded Interview (2006)
(unpublished training manual) (on file with author) (describing, as part of a
police interrogation training program, various aspects of interrogation and
questioning). The purpose of the interview is "[t]o gather information (not to
get a confession) as part of a thorough and exhaustive investigation." Id. at 4.
156. Id. at 10. Neutral, open-ended questions give the suspect an
opportunity to provide information without putting her on the defensive. The
officer attempts to develop good rapport with the suspect. "Set yourself up as
the simple and impartial carrier of facts. You are the vehicle that takes the
story to the higher power-the people who decide the suspect's fate (e.g.,
charging attorney, judge, jury) . . . . Continually reinforce your role as partner
and messenger, rather than decision-maker."). Id. at 18-19.
157. See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 7, at 4-5; Leo, Interrogation
Room, supra note 7, at 267-68 ("[W]e know scant more about actual police
interrogation practices today than we did in 1966 when Justice Earl Warren
lamented the gap problem in Miranda v. Arizona."). See generally Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 840 (1996) (decrying the
dearth of knowledge about police interrogations); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631 (1996) ("[E]verything
we know to date about the impact of Miranda comes from research that was
undertaken when Miranda was still in its infancy.").
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and the impact of warnings on rates of confessions.168 Only the 1967
Yale-New Haven study actually observed police questioning
suspects.159 In the mid-1990s, Richard Leo conducted the only field
study of interrogation in the United States.160 I have studied tapes
and transcripts of interrogations, 16 1 and researchers have used other
indirect methods. 162 Researchers in England have analyzed the
158. After Miranda, studies measured police compliance and the impact of
warnings on confession rates. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Leiken, Police
Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. L.J. 1, 11
(1970) (interviewing jailed suspects about Miranda warnings); Richard J.
Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1348-50 (1968); Richard
H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical
Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1967) ("Miranda has not impaired significantly
the ability of the law enforcement agencies to apprehend and convict the
criminal."); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration
of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 320, 326-27 (1973). Most researchers concluded that Miranda
had a minimal effect on rates of confession and conviction or on interrogation
tactics. See, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 547 (1996)
("Miranda's empirically detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero.");
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and
Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821, 837 (1996) ("[T]here is no
proof of a Miranda effect on the confession rate."). But see Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 394,
417 (1996) (arguing Miranda's costs include "lost confessions," i.e., statements
not obtained because warnings dissuade suspects from talking).
159. See Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1533-58, 1613 (1967) (observing police
interrogation of suspects and concluding "[n]ot much has changed after
Miranda").
160. In 1992-93, Richard Leo observed 122 interrogations at a major urban
police department and reviewed sixty videotaped interrogations performed by
two other police departments. Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 268;
see also Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence
Game, 30 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 259, 263 (1996).
161. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Cops and Kids in the Interrogation Room, in
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING 35, 38 (Ray Bull ed., 2014); FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 275 (analyzing 307 interrogation tapes and
transcripts); Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When
Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 395, 419-21 (2013); Feld,
Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra note 84, at 62-63
(analyzing sixty-six tapes and transcripts of interrogation of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old felony delinquents in one county in Minnesota); Feld, Police
Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 84, at 248-49; Feld, Real Interrogation,
supra note 8, at 1.
162. See, e.g., Cassell & Hayman, supra note 157, at 851-52 (describing how
researchers attended screening sessions about interrogations that were
conducted by the prosecutor of the police officer); King & Snook, supra note 139
(analyzing forty-four recorded criminal interrogations in Canada to assess the
prevalence of Reid Method tactics); Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note
137, at 1521 (analyzing police training materials); Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, supra note 137, at 134-40 (analyzing police training materials).
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PACE Act recordings and transcripts and generated a substantial
body of empirical research. 163  Psychologists have conducted
extensive laboratory research for decades on the dynamics of
questioning and the vulnerability of certain populations, but these
studies lack the external validity of custodial interrogation. 1 6 4 False
confessions provide another look at how police question suspects and
highlight the heightened vulnerability of youths.165
In light of the general paucity of interrogation research, it
should come as no surprise that we know very little about whether
police question male and female suspects differently. Limited
laboratory research reports few differences between how boys and
girls respond to police interrogation. "Nearly all of the studies that
have examined gender differences in Miranda comprehension have
found no differences between males' and females' understanding
and/or appreciation of rights."166  One analyst reported minor
differences, but attributed female delinquents' poorer understanding
of Miranda to less justice system experience and contact with
lawyers, rather than to gender per se.167
This Article examines what happens when police interrogate
female delinquents charged with serious offenses. It assesses
163. See, e.g.,ROGER EVANS, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH JUVENILES (1993) (analyzing The PACE
Act transcripts of police interviews of juveniles); GUDJONSSON, supra note 126,
at 59-60, 79-80 (employing sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods
to code and analyze tapes and transcripts of interrogations); MILNE & BULL,
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 148, at 75-76; Bull & Soukara, supra
note 148, at 84-93 (analyzing audio tapes of interrogations); Roger Evans,
Police Interrogations and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 4
POLICING & Soc'Y 73, 79-80 (1994); J. Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and
Psychological Vulnerabilities: Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession, 8 J.
CMTY. & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1998).
164. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does
Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 218-21 (2005)
[hereinafter Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions] (summarizing laboratory
studies and simulations of police interrogation); Kassin et al., supra note 84, at
16-17; Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 140, at 223
(describing "maximization" and "minimization" techniques); Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 136, at 37.
165. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 279 (2011) [hereinafter GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT] (reporting false confessions in 16% of wrongful
convictions); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES
WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 119-21 (2003); Drizin & Leo, supra note 127,
at 902 (noting that false confessions occur in about 14-25% or more of cases of
wrongful convictions and DNA exonerations); Garrett, supra note 84, at 66, 89
(reporting that of 200 DNA exonorees, 11% were juveniles and many wrongful
convictions contained false confessions); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in
the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545
(2005) (reporting that 42% of juveniles gave false confessions).
166. GOLDSTEIN & SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, at 68.
167. Viljoen & Roesch, supra note 120, at 738.
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whether girls waive Miranda rights significantly more often than
boys. It compares and contrasts how police question girls and boys.
It reports how police and justice system personnel perceive girls in
the interrogation room.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Scales
required police to record custodial interrogations.168 Scales held
that "all custodial interrogation including any information about
rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be
electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when
questioning occurs at a place of detention."169 Currently, about a
dozen states require police to record some or all interrogations. 170
This study analyzes Scales interrogation tapes and transcripts,
and the police reports, juvenile court petitions, and sentences of
youths charged with felony offenses. Delinquency trials of sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old youths charged with felony offenses are
public proceedings.171 County Attorneys in Minnesota's four largest
counties allowed me to search the files of sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old youths charged with a felony1 72 and to copy those files in
168. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
169. Id. The Minnesota court in Scales (adopting the reasoning of the
Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Stephan, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Alaska
1985)) became the first state to require recording of custodial interrogations.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592.
170. See Thomas P. Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, in
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS, CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 146, at 127, 127-28; see, e.g., In re
Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Wis. 2005); see also GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT, supra note 165, at 341 n.23 (listing statutes and regulations that
require recording of interrogations); THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, Nw. UNIv. SCH. OF
LAw, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS, app. Al-A10 (2004) (listing police departments
that record custodial interrogations); Allison D. Redlich & Steven Drizin, Police
Interrogation of Youth, in THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUNG OFFENDERS 61,
73 (Carol L. Kessler & Louis James Kraus eds., 2007); Thomas P. Sullivan, The
Time Has Come for Law Enforcement Recordings of Custodial Interviews, Start
to Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 175, 176-77 (2006).
171. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163(1)(c)(2) (2005). At the request of the County
Attorneys, this study focused on older felony delinquents to obviate some
privacy concerns.
172. The files involved cases in which all court proceedings had been
concluded, but which had not yet been transferred to storage in archives. Police
conducted most of the interrogations in this study between about 2003 and
2006. Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, and Ramsey Counties are the four most
populous of Minnesota's eighty-seven counties and account for almost half
(47.6%) of the state's population and nearly half (45.6%) of the delinquency
petitions filed. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 272 for
a more complete description of the methodology and data summarized here.
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which police interrogated or juveniles invoked Miranda.173  I
obtained 307 files in which juveniles invoked or waived Miranda.
Thirty-three cases involved female delinquents, which I compare
and contrast with those of male delinquents.
I reviewed police reports and other documents to learn about
the crime, the context of interrogation, and what evidence police
possessed when they questioned a suspect. I coded each file to
analyze where and when interrogations took place, who was present,
how police gave the Miranda warning, whether juveniles invoked or
waived, how officers questioned juveniles, how they responded, and
how invoking Miranda affected case processing.174 The 307 files
reflect some sample selection bias because they are charged cases,
serious delinquents, more likely to go to trial, and perhaps include
more juveniles who waived Miranda.175 Despite these caveats, the
study includes a range of serious crimes, analyzes one of the largest
number of routine felony interrogations ever aggregated in the
United States, and reports on how police question serious female
suspects. More than 150 officers from more than fifty agencies
173. Court orders authorized access to juvenile courts' files and included
confidentiality restrictions to protect juveniles' identities. I personally
transcribed interrogation tapes and coded all of the files to address
confidentiality concerns. The courts' confidentiality restrictions precluded use
of multiple coders and inter-rater reliability scores.
174. I obtained, modified, and expanded codebooks used in prior
interrogation research. See generally Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7;
John Pearse & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Identification and Measurement of
"Oppressive" Police Interviewing Tactics in Britain, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 75 (2003); Wald et al., supra
note 159.
175. The sample includes only juveniles whom prosecutors charged with a
felony and for whom an interrogation or invocation record exists. Other
evidence being equal, prosecutors are more likely to charge suspects who waive
Miranda than those who invoke Miranda because they have plea bargain
advantage. Police made these Scales recordings during custodial interrogation,
and the files do not include unrecorded, noncustodial interviews. The felony
cases in which prosecutors charged that contained transcripts may differ in
some ways from those in which juveniles invoked Miranda or from those that
police did not move forward on charging. They may also differ from those cases
that prosecutors did not charge, or from those that they charged but which did
not contain transcripts. Minnesota excludes cases of sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old youths charged with Murder 1 from juvenile court jurisdiction. MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.007(6)(B) (2011); see also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy:
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1051-57
(1995). Also, prosecutors filed transfer motions against some other youths
charged with the most serious offenses. See generally Marcy Rasmussen
Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449, 462-68 (1996). As a result,
the sample under-represents some of the most serious crimes: murder, criminal
sexual conduct, and armed offenses.
2014] 1089
1090 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
interviewed these suspects. 176 In addition to the quantitative data, I
interviewed police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and juvenile court
judges to elicit their views, learn from their experiences, and test my
findings.177 I also asked whether they perceived differences between
boys and girls in the interrogation room and, if so, what were the
differences.
III. QUESTIONING GIRLS
After describing characteristics of the youths in this study, I
examine quantitative data on boys' and girls' invocation or waiver of
Miranda rights. I then analyze how police questioned the vast
majority of boys and girls who waived their Miranda rights and the
outcomes of interrogations. In the next Part, I present qualitative
data of how police and justice system personnel perceived girls in
the interrogation room.
A. Quantitative Findings: Police Question Boys and Girls
Similarly
Table 1 describes the boys and girls in this study. Girls
comprised one-tenth (10.7%) of the youths whom prosecutors
charged with felony offenses-the same ratio at which police arrest
girls and boys for felony-level crimes.178 Although girls constitute a
small portion of the felons whom police questioned, the girl results
are strikingly similar to the boy results. A significantly larger
176. We do not know how community contexts, police department cultures,
or interrogation practices vary or how those variations affect suspects' waivers
or invocations. See generally EVANS, supra note 163, at 21-22; Richard A. Leo,
The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation in the United
States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT 37 (G. Daniel
Lassiter ed., 2004); Allison D. Redlich & Christian A. Meissner, Techniques and
Controversies in the Interrogation of Suspects: The Artful Practice Versus the
Scientific Study, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: CONSENSUS AND
CONTROVERSY 124 (Jennifer L. Skeem et al. eds., 2009) (examining research on
interrogation and interrogation techniques and controversies while
distinguishing between empirical research and actual practice). Minnesota
police likely adjusted their interrogation tactics to accommodate Scales'
recording requirement. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 155, at 11-12.
177. I interviewed nineteen police officers, six juvenile prosecutors, nine
juvenile defense lawyers, and five juvenile court judges from both urban and
suburban counties. The police officers averaged 18.4 years of professional
experience; the prosecutors averaged 14.5 years; the public defenders averaged
13.3 years; and the juvenile court judges averaged 16 years. I interviewed
sergeants, detectives or investigators, and school resource officers of the ranks
and specialties that conduct the most custodial interrogations of juveniles. The
recorded interviews lasted between thirty and eighty minutes, averaged about
forty-five minutes, and provided thick descriptions of the process. I conducted
saturation interviews until no new data, themes, or conceptual relationships
emerged. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 280-81, for
a more complete description of the methodology.
178. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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proportion of girls were seventeen years old compared with boys
(66.7% vs. 40.1%). There were no other statistically significant
differences between girls and boys questioned by police. Nearly two-
thirds (63.6%) of the girls questioned by police lived in urban
counties, whereas the boys were more evenly distributed between
urban (52.2%) and suburban (47.8%) locales. The types of crimes
that delinquents committed in urban and suburban counties were
not significantly different. Prosecutors charged a somewhat larger
proportion of girls with property and drug crimes and a smaller
proportion with violent crimes than they did boys, but these
differences were not statistically significant. Girls had somewhat
fewer prior arrests, but again the differences were not statistically
significant. Because the boys and girls are so similar, I attribute
differences in how police questioned them and their responses to
gender.
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TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILES INTERROGATED BY
GENDER*
Male Female
N % N %
Age**
16 161 58.8 10 30.3
17 110 40.1 22 66.7
18 3 1.1 1 3.0
Race
White 144 53.1 16 48.5
Black 95 35.1 12 36.4
Other 32 11.8 5 15.2
County Type
Urban 143 52.2 21 63.6
Suburban 131 47.8 12 36.4
Offense
Property' 148 54.0 21 63.6
Person2  91 33.2 6 18.2
Drugss 15 5.5 4 12.1
Firearms' 16 5.8 1 3.0
Others 4 1.5 1 3.0
Prior Arrests
None 84 31.3 13 40.6
Status 40 14.9 7 21.9
Misdemeanor 63 23.5 9 28.1
One Felony 42 15.7 3 9.4
Two or More
Felonies 39 14.6 0 0.0
Prior Juvenile Court
Referrals
None 111 42.2 15 50.0
One or More 152 57.8 15 50.0
Court Status at Time of
Interrogation
None 125 47.3 17 54.8
Prior Supervision 56 21.2 5 16.1
Current
ProbatiorVParole 67 25.4 8 25.8
Current Placement 16 6.1 1 3.2
Study Total 274 89.3 33 10.7
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*This Table was previously published in substantially the same form in FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 284. Totals for separate variables may not equal 100% of N due
to unavailable data.
*Statistically significant at: X2 (2, N = 307) = 9.946, p < .05
Crimes against property include burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, arson, receiving stolen
property, possession of stolen property, possession of burglary tools, criminal damage to
property, theft, forgery, theft by swindle, and credit card fraud.
2 Crimes against the person include aggravated and simple robbery, aggravated assault,
murder and attempted murder, criminal vehicular homicide, criminal sexual conduct, and
terroristic threats.
S Drug crimes include sale or possession of a controlled substance (crack, methamphetamine,
marijuana, codeine, ecstasy, heroin), possession of a forged prescription, and tampering with
anhydrous ammonia equipment (methamphetamine).
4 Firearm crimes include possession of a firearm, discharge of a firearm, theft of a firearm,
possession of an explosive device, and drive-by shooting.
5 Other offenses are fleeing a police officer.
Very few differences distinguish the context in which police
questioned boys and girls. 179  Police arrested, detained, and
questioned equal proportions of girls and boys in custodial locations,
such as police stations or detention centers (78.8% girls; 78.9%
boys).180 They questioned a somewhat larger proportion of girls
than they did boys within twenty-four hours of the offense (78.8%
vs. 68.6%, respectively), suggesting that more girls were caught in
the act. As a result, police had somewhat stronger evidence at the
time they questioned girls than boys (78.8% vs. 61.8%,
respectively).181 This, in turn, would somewhat reduce their need to
use more confrontational tactics to elicit information.
The Court in Miranda required police to warn a suspect to
dispel the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation.182 Justice
White's Miranda dissent asked why those same compulsive
pressures do not coerce a waiver as readily as an unwarned
statement.183 Research confirms Justice White's intuition that after
police isolate suspects in a police-dominated environment, a warning
cannot adequately empower them.184 Post-Miranda studies reported
179. See generally FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8
(providing a more complete account of the data gathered in this study).
180. Id. at 283. Overall, 78.8% of interrogations occurred in custodial
settings and police detained nearly two-thirds (61.7%) of those whom they
questioned. Id. at 63.
181. Id. at 283.
182. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458, 476-77 (1966).
183. Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court apparently realizes its
dilemma of foreclosing questioning without the necessary warnings but at the
same time permitting the accused, sitting in the same chair in front of the same
policemen, to waive his right to consult an attorney.").
184. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule:
Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF.
L. REV. 465, 528-29 (2005) (observing how questioning can lead a suspect to
"feel harassed"); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105,
119-20 (1997) ("[E]ven when a suspect has nothing to conceal, he may
experience anxiety because of the dynamics of the interrogation process."); see
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that about 80% of adult suspects waived their rights. 185 The Yale-
New Haven study concluded, "[W]arnings had little impact on
suspects' behavior."186 Richard A. Leo reported that more than
three-quarters (78%) of suspects waived their rights after receiving
the warnings.187 Observers of police-prosecutor charging
conferences reported that 83.7% of adult suspects waived.188 A
survey of police estimated that 81% of adult suspects waived.189
Juveniles waive Miranda at somewhat higher rates than adults
do-about 90% of the time.o9 0 Juveniles' higher waiver rates may
reflect lack of understanding, inability to invoke rights effectively, or
less prior involvement with the justice system. 191 Table 2 reports
that boys and girls waived their Miranda rights at statistically
similar rates (92.3% boys; 97% girls; and an overall waiver rate of
92.8%). Interviews with police and justice system personnel
confirmed the validity of this finding: nearly all delinquents-male
and female-waived Miranda.192 The marginal difference in rates of
Miranda waivers by gender is consistent with the police officers'
experiences. One officer observed, "[Girls] may be a little less likely
to refuse to talk to you. I don't think I've ever had a female refuse to
also Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 137, at 1537-38
("[I]nterrogation . . . works by increasing suspects' anxiety, instilling a feeling of
hopelessness, and ... leading them to believe that they will benefit by making a
statement.").
185. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 93-94.
186. Wald et al.,, supra note 159, at 1563.
187. Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 276.
188. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 157, at 859.
189. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report
Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAw & HuVI. BEHAv. 381, 389 (2007).
190. See GOLDSTEIN & SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, supra note 115, at 50 (stating that
studies conducted in the 1970s found rates of waiver by juveniles to be over 90%
and a study in 2005 found the rate of waiver to be 87%); GRISSO, supra note 86,
at 36 (reporting that juveniles refused to talk during interrogations at a
"considerably smaller" rate than adults); J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter,
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and
Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 333-34 (1977) (finding 90.6% of
juvenile felony suspects chose to talk when interrogated); Viljoen et al., supra
note 115, at 261 (reporting that, in a retrospective study of delinquents
interviewed in detention, 13.15% reported they had asserted their right to
silence).
191. See Viljoen & Roesch, supra note 120, at 736-37.
192. See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 95
(noting that "[w]hen asked how many juveniles waive Miranda, one officer said,
'Almost all of them. I couldn't even tell you the last time a kid told me he didn't
want to talk.' Another estimated 90%: '[N]ot very many kids that don't talk to
you.' Other police officer[s] said, 'I haven't had very many not speak to me. I
would have to say 95% of them or more talk.' A second confirmed, 'I'd say better
than 95%,' and a third said, 'Vast majority. I'd say high 90s.' A suburban
prosecutor observed, 'We don't have very sophisticated criminals. Maybe 10%
refuse to talk.' Almost all personnel thought that 90% or more of youths waive
Miranda, and none estimated that fewer than 80% waive").
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talk to me. They always want to say something, even if it's a
denial."193
TABLE 2: JUVENILES WHO WAIVED OR INVOKED MIRANDA BY GENDER
AND PRIOR ARRESTS
Miranda Male Female Total
Waive N = 253 32 285
% = 92.3 97.0 92.8
Invoke N = 21 1 22
% = 7.7 3.0 7.2
Prior Arrests*
Non-Felony
Waive N = 176 29 205
% = 94.1 100.0 94.9
Invoke N = 11 0 11
%= 5.9 .0 5.1
One or More Felony
Waive N= 71 2 73
% = 87.7 66.7 86.9
Invoke N = 10 1 11
% = 12.3 33.3 13.1
Statistically significant at X2 (1, N = 300) = 5.7, p <.05. Totals for separate variables may not
equal 100% of N due to missing data.
The Court in Fare v. Michael C. cited Michael C.'s prior
experience with police when it found a valid waiver.194
Criminologists report a relationship between prior arrests and
Miranda invocations. 195 Suspects with prior arrests waived their
rights and confessed at lower rates than did those with less
experience. 196 More than one-quarter (27.4%) of the juveniles in this
193. Id. at 284.
194. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979); see also GRISSO, supra
note 86, at 64 (reporting that judges cite a juvenile's prior experience to find she
understood Miranda warning).
195. See Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 286 ("[A] suspect with a
felony record . .. was almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights
as a suspect with no prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as a
suspect with a misdemeanor record.").
196. See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 86, at 37 (reporting that juveniles with
prior felony referrals were less likely to talk); Kassin, On the Psychology of
10952014]
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study had one or more prior felony arrests at the time of
questioning. 197 As Table 2 reports, both male and female
delinquents with one or more prior felony arrests were significantly
more likely to invoke Miranda than those with less experience.
Several factors likely contribute to boys and girls with more
serious prior records having a greater likelihood to invoke Miranda.
Prior arrests give youths opportunities to spend time with lawyers,
learn about rights, and understand legal proceedings.19 8 Prior
felony arrests provide a reasonable proxy for understanding how to
navigate the justice system. 199 Prior arrests provide opportunities to
hear Miranda warnings, experience interrogation, consult with
counsel, and learn the adverse consequences of waiving. 200 Justice
system personnel described youths who invoked Miranda as
"sophisticated," "savvy," "streetwise," "gang-involved," or similarly
experienced. 201
Interrogation enables police to obtain incriminating admissions
or leads to other evidence-physical evidence, witnesses, or stolen
property-which strengthens prosecutors' cases and facilitates
guilty pleas. 202 Police seek suspects' statements-true or false-to
contradict changes they later make in their stories and impeach
their credibility. 203 Police tell suspects that the interview is their
opportunity to "tell their story."204 They described themselves as
Confessions, supra note 164, at 218 (reporting that individuals with criminaljustice experience are less likely to waive rights than those with no prior felony
record); Leiken, supra note 158, at 21 tbl.4 (reporting that defendants with
prior arrests and felony convictions gave fewer confessions than did those with
fewer arrests or convictions).
197. Supra Table 1.
198. See Viljoen & Roesch, supra note 120, at 737 (finding that juveniles
with prior arrests had spent time with lawyers and gained a greater
understanding of rights and legal proceedings).
199. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 99.
200. Id.
201. Id. A police officer described youths who invoke Miranda as "more
streetwise. They've been in the system. They know that talking to us isn't
going to help them; it's just going to help us get them convicted. They're more
streetwise, they're tougher kids. They know the game." Id. at 100. A public
defender described them similarly. "[They're] the ones who have been through
the system before and are more savvy, are a little more streetwise . . .. The
kids who have experience tend not to give up their rights as easily as first-
timers." Id. at 99-100. A prosecutor attributed youths' invocations "largely [to]
prior exposure to the system . . . [as] [c]ertain juveniles develop street smarts,
savvy about the system. Those are the juveniles-repeated customers-who
develop resistance to talking to the police because they've learned." Id. at 100.
202. Id. at 104.
203. Id. at 104-05.
204. Id. at 108. Several officers gave similar descriptions of their standard
opening to an interrogation. "You just go in and tell them that this is your
opportunity to tell me your side of the story. I've already got the other side of
the story. I just want to hear what you say happened, and then I'm going to
write it up and send it on. And they'll decide." Id.
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neutral report-writers who want to forward the suspect's statement
to prosecutors and judges for evaluation. 205  '
Police use maximization and minimization tactics to overcome
resistance and make it easier to confess. 206 Maximization strategies
emphasize the seriousness of a crime, the strength of the evidence,
and the futility of denials.207 Minimization techniques provide
moral justifications and face-saving alternatives, or shift blame to
others. 208 Police use maximization tactics to scare or intimidate
suspects by confronting them with evidence and similar
strategies.209  Officers may challenge inconsistencies or
contradictions, explain that the suspect's claims are implausible,
and describe the negative impact false statements have on
prosecutors and judges. Police initially encouraged a suspect to
commit to a story and then used confrontational tactics to challenge
that version. 210 Police confronted suspects with evidence (54.4%);
accused them of lying (32.6%); exhorted them to tell the truth
(29.5%); asked Behavioral Analysis Interview questions (28.8%);
challenged inconsistencies (20.0%); emphasized the seriousness of
the crime (14.4%); and accused them of other crimes (8.4%).211 In
nearly one-third (30.9%) of interrogations, police did not use any
maximization tactics; in another quarter (23.1%), they used only
one.212 Most youths apparently did not require a lot of persuasion or
intimidation to induce them to talk.
This study found that police used maximization tactics
significantly more often to interrogate boys than they did to
question girls. Table 3 reports that police confronted a larger
205. Id. at 105. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
206. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 110; Kassin et
al., supra note 84, at 12; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 278-79
(explaining that interrogators use "negative incentives (tactics that suggest the
suspect should confess because of no other plausible course of action) and
positive incentives (tactics that suggest the suspect will in some way feel better
or benefit if he confesses)."). See generally Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note
136, at 42-44 (describing the interrogation process, including the use of
minimization).
207. See Kassin et al., supra note 84, at 12 ("Maximization [is] designed to
convey .. . that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail."); Kassin, The
Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 140, at 223
("[Maximization] . . . uses 'scare tactics' designed to intimidate a suspect
believed to be guilty.").
208. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 140, at 223
("[Minimization . . . is a 'soft sell' technique in which the detective tries to lull
the suspect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance, face-
saving excuses, and moral justification; by blaming the victim or an accomplice;
and by underplaying the seriousness or magnitude of the charges.").
209. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 110; Feld, Real
Interrogation, supra note 8, at 5; Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 278.
210. Leo, Interrogation Room, supra note 7, at 278.
211. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 110.
212. Id. at 112.
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proportion of boys than girls with evidence (56.1% vs. 40.6%). They
accused boys of lying twice as often as they did girls (34.4% vs.
18.8%). They urged boys to tell the truth almost three times as
often as they did girls (31.6% vs. 12.5%). Recall that police
questioned a larger proportion of girls than boys within twenty-four
hours of the offense (78.8% vs. 68.6%), and had stronger evidence
when they questioned girls than boys (78.8% vs. 61.8%). Because
more girls were "caught in the act," police had less need to use
maximization tactics.
No statistically significant differences emerged for police use of
minimization tactics to question boys and girls. Boys and girls
responded to police questioning very similarly. Girls were
somewhat more likely than boys to give extended answers and
somewhat less likely to deny their involvement, but the differences
were not significant. One public defender reported, "Girls talk more.
The girls will volunteer information."213 Girls' propensity to talk
made the task of a defense lawyer "a giant nightmare."214
TABLE 3: MAXIMIZATION QUESTIONS: TYPES AND FREQUENCY BY
GENDER*
Male Female
Interrogation
Strategy N % of Cases N % of Cases
Confront with
Evidence* 142 56.1 13 40.6
Accuse of
Lying*** 87 34.4 6 18.8
Tell the Truth**** 80 31.6 4 12.5
BAI Questions 75 29.6 7 21.9
Confront 52 20.6 5 15.6
Trouble 36 14.2 5 15.6
Accuse Other
Crimes 23 9.1 1 3.1
*This Table was previously published in substantially the same form in FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 284. Based on juveniles (N=285) who waived Miranda rights
and whom police questioned.
**Statistically significant at: X2 (1, N = 285) = 2.752, p < .1
***Statistically significant at: X2 (1, N = 285) = 3.160, p < .1
****Statistically significant at: X2 (1, N = 285) = 4.996, p <.05
213. Id. at 285.
214. Id.
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Girls were somewhat more likely than boys to confess (68.8% vs.
57.3%), and less likely to completely deny their involvement (3.1%
vs. 12.6%), differences that were not statistically significant. 215 Boys
were significantly more likely than girls to provide police with leads
to other corroborating evidence (19.8% vs. 6.3%).216 Most boys and
girls exhibited similarly cooperative attitudes when police
questioned them (79.1% boys; 84.4% girls).217 Police questioned boys
and girls for similar, brief lengths of time and concluded 90% of
interviews in less than thirty minutes. 218
There were no significant differences between the level of
offense for which the State convicted boys and girls, "whether the
State reduced charges, or the type of disposition they received." 219
Apart from officers' somewhat greater use of maximization
techniques with boys, police questioned boys and girls very
similarly, youths responded in the same ways, and youths confessed
at the same rates. Police are trained to question suspects in one
way and they use the same techniques whether they question adults
or juveniles, and boys or girls.
B. Qualitative Findings: Justice Personnel Perceive Girls
Differently than Boys-Emotional or Confrontational
Few criminologists have interviewed juvenile justice personnel
to elicit their perceptions of girls. Emily Gaarder interviewed
juvenile probation officers to obtain their views of girls and how
those assessments might affect their treatment.220 Despite girls'
histories of abuse and neglect, probation officers consistently
described them as "manipulative, liars, and criers."2 2 1 The study
described a disconnect between the trauma in girls' case files-
histories of sexual abuse and teenage parenthood-and probation
officers' negative descriptions of girls as manipulative and
complaining, 222 and "troubled and troublesome."223 Another study of
juvenile intake workers reported that they found girls more difficult
to work with than boys because they were more emotional and
manipulative. 224 They negatively described girls as "manipulative
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 156. Most interrogations, of adults and juveniles, are
surprisingly brief. Id. Police concluded over 75% of these interviews in less
than fifteen minutes and 90% in less than half an hour. Id. Juveniles
questioned about guns elicited longer interrogations. Id. at 165.
219. Id.
220. Gaarder et al., supra note 61, at 547.
221. Id. at 556.
222. Id. at 555.
223. Id. at 558.
224. See Bond-Maupin et al., supra note 44, at 57-58.
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and uncooperative." 225 Youth workers in Australian juvenile courts
perceived girls as more difficult to work with than boys. 22 6 The
limited research on justice personnel's perceptions of girls reports
consistent negative attributions.
I asked police and justice system personnel to describe
differences between boys and girls in the interrogation room.
Several noted that it was a difficult question to answer because "we
have very few girls."2 2 7 One public defender commented, "We don't
see many girls come through. I could probably count on my hand
the number of serious felonies I've had where the respondent was
female, one hand."22 8
With that caveat, justice system personnel described differences
between boys and girls in the interrogation room. Consistent with
the quantitative data, police described girls as "more likely to talk,
less likely to invoke their rights."229  Because of their greater
propensity to talk, police were less likely to use maximization tactics
to elicit statements. One prosecutor attributed girls' greater
likelihood to talk to the presence of powerful adults. "[It's] an
authority figure. Girls tend to be more cooperative and talk
more."2 30 Even when charged with felony offenses, several police
suggested that girls talked more freely because they played a
secondary role in the crime. "Usually the girls are kind of just along
for the ride and usually tell it as best they can, minimizing their
activities."231 One officer explained as follows:
Usually in felony-level offenses, [girls] play more of a
peripheral role. In the ag[gravated] robbery cases, they're the
get-away driver. But they're usually not the one going in
brandishing the gun, jumping over the counter, grabbing the
money out of the till. That's usually the boys. So my sense is
they talk more because they're [thinking] "I'm not going down.
He's the one that did all that." My sense is they would talk
more. 232
225. Id. at 65-66.
226. See generally Margaret Baines & Christine Adler, Are Girls More
Difficult to Work With? Youth Workers' Perspective in Juvenile Justice and
Related Areas, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 467, 481 (1996) (reporting that youth
workers described young women as "devious, 'full of bullshit,' and 'dramatic'
contrasted with their understanding of young men as 'open' and 'honest' and
therefore easier to engage.").
227. Id. at 286.
228. FELD, KIDS, COPS, CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 286.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
1100 [Vol. 49
QUESTIONING GENDER
Justice system actors attributed girls' cooperation to their
desire to explain and justify their behavior. One officer observed as
follows:
They feel like they had some justification in doing what they
did because the person who they directed their violence toward
had mistreated them somehow. So their explanation always
had the tone of 'if you just hear what I have to say, you'll
understand that I was the one that was in the right.'233
A prosecutor agreed that girls tended to be more self-justifying.
For example, he explained that in fights between girls, "My sense is
that they would also try to assert self-defense more. When girls
fight, they're much more likely to say, 'I was just defending
myself."' 2 34 A public defender offered a similar contrast between
how male and female delinquents respond. "Girls are more likely to
spin a story of self-justification. Boys are more likely to deny or to
admit their involvement and try to minimize that way. Girls are
more likely to tell why what they did wasn't wrong."2 3 5
Other research describes boys as straightforward and girls as
manipulative or conniving.236 Some officers described girls' use of
gender roles to try to manipulate them: "I think attractive young
females think they are going to get more of a break with the system
and not be treated as harshly, because they've learned that some
where socially. They think they can talk their way through it
because they've done it in other circumstances." 237  Similarly,
another officer opined that "girls are little bit more adept at being
charming when they're lying."238
In addition to describing girls as cooperative or self-justifying,
justice system actors proffered two contradictory views of girls as
either emotional or confrontational-themes reflected in other
studies. On the one hand, police described girls as more emotional
than boys when questioned about their crimes. One officer said,
"Girls are usually more emotional. They cry more often."2 39 A
233. Id. at 287.
234. Interview with Assistant County Attorney, Juvenile Division, in St.
Paul, Minn. (Jan. 25, 2011) (on file with the author).
235. Id.
236. See Gaarder et al., supra note 61, at 556-58. This type of
characterization appears in other studies. See, e.g., Bond-Maupin et al., supra
note 44, at 65-66.
237. Interview with Juvenile Division Police Officer, in St. Paul, Minn. (Dec.
20, 2010) (on file with the author); see also Bond-Maupin et al., supra note 44,
at 66 (attributing girls' manipulation to their sexuality: "If you aren't careful
with girls, they pull the wool over your eyes. They come in here, put some
perfume on, cosmetics, lipstick, and you know").
238. Interview with Juvenile Division Police Officer, in St. Paul, Minn. (Dec.
16, 2010) (on file with the author).
239. FELD, KIDS, COPS, CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 286.
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suburban officer noted, "You get a lot more crying, a lot more
emotion from juvenile females than you do from juvenile males-
emotions and attitude."240 A public defender opined, "Girls in
general tend to be much more emotional at the scene and disclose
information right then and there . . .. They kind of like just tell it
like it is. And usually they're quite emotional about it."241 A police
officer contrasted his experience questioning adolescent and adult
women: "[A]dult women are different from adolescent girls. It's
really striking: [girls are] so quick to start screaming at you-much
more emotional."242
On the other hand, police officers described girls as much more
confrontational than boys. Officers described questioning girls as an
unpleasant experience: "The toughest to interview, by the way, is a
16-year-old female. They don't care. They'll lie [to you] like their
[sic] talking to you." 2 4 3  Police felt that boys were more
straightforward, whereas girls used verbal aggression as a defense.
Officers felt that girls had a sense of being impervious. "They have
an attitude of arrogance, a naive belief that they're untouchable.
They tend to be more noncompliant."244 One female police officer
observed that "dealing with young female offenders is much more
miserable than dealing with young males. They just tend to be
great big attitudes and playing the victim card and just all kinds of
difficult things to wade through before you can get to the situation
you're trying to deal with."2 4 5 Several more police officers expressed
negative opinions about questioning girls:
When we're dealing with a lot of girls, they have a tendency to
be more loud-bitchy, for lack of a better word. Boys are boys.
They're tough guys to begin with. Girls that want to be the
tough guys, they're kind of a pain in the ass to deal with.
They're not afraid to yap at you. They're less apt to be afraid
of you than guys are. 246
Several officers described the girls they interrogated as more
verbally aggressive and confrontational than the boys:
240. Id. at 287.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 288.
244. Id.
245. Interview with Police Detective, in St. Paul, Minn. (Dec. 6, 2010) (on file
with the author).
246. Id.
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Especially the hard-core girls, they come off real harsh with a
real attitude. It's kind of interesting sometimes, when you
see-they're not meek or timid. The girls I talk to have always
been very abrasive. A lot of them do not like to admit they did
anything wrong. I get boys saying "Hey, I screwed up. I did
it," and the girls deny until they turn blue in the face.
Girls are a lot more hostile in their interviewing. They are
more apt to raise the level of the interview in the interrogation
into a more aggressive type of environment. They're a lot more
hostile, a lot more quick to get into your face. They just don't
seem to appear to feel-they're not afraid of you. I don't know
why. They're sometimes not afraid of you. 247
Justice system personnel speculated that differences in boys'
and girls' attitudes reflected differences in their delinquent
careers. 248 For example, a suburban prosecutor suggested that girls
evinced more problems-sexual abuse, mental illness, drug
involvement-than did their male counterparts. 249 The prosecutor
attributed girls' more emotional responses than those of boys to the
greater personal difficulties girls faced: "Girls in court are probably
struggling more with sex abuse perpetrated on them [and] mental
illness. Girls are more likely to be seriously into drugs. They're
such a different delinquent than boys."2 5 0
A police officer hypothesized that the justice system did not
respond to girls' delinquency until they were further along in their
delinquent careers: "They probably get away with a lot more. They
probably get further into a life of crime before they get caught."251
A public defender suggested that police may sometimes evoke
the negative responses by the way in which they questioned girls. A
lawyer observed as follows:
247. Id.
248. See generally Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 50, at 475 (articulating
theoretical variables that account for females' lesser involvement in crime,
especially violent crime: "gender norms, moral development and affiliative
concerns, social control, physical strength and aggression, and sexuality.
Gender differences in these areas condition gender differences in patterns of
motivation and access to criminal opportunities as well as gender differences in
the type, frequency, and context of offending").
249. FELD, KIDS, COPS, CONFESSIONS, supra note 8, at 287.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 287-88.
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[Police interrogators] tend to approach girls as [if] they must
either be terrible criminals or in abusive relationships with
their boyfriends, or being prostituted. The girls are
immediately defensive and pissed off at that kind of suggestion
and go off at the police officers or anyone else who tries to talk
to them about those issues. 252
Although the quantitative data indicate that police do not
interrogate girls differently than boys, the gender stereotypes held
by the officers may still harm the girls they question. How should
police question girls about potential abuse without offending,
alienating, or stereotyping them? How can officers elicit
information without treating the girls as "terrible criminals" or
"pissing them off' while questioning them? We do not know whether
officers' attitudes precipitate the hostile reactions of which they
complain or whether these attitudes cause officers to fail at serving
girls in need of help and protection.
CONCLUSION
The quantitative data revealed very few differences between
how police interrogated boys and girls for felony level offenses. Most
police are trained to use the Reid Method to interrogate suspects
and they use the same techniques with all offenders-younger or
older, male or female. Although serious delinquent girls comprise
only a small subset of juvenile courts' caseloads, the boys and girls
in this sample are remarkably similar in terms of their present
offenses, prior records, and previous juvenile court involvement. In
addition, police questioned boys and girls in similar venues and
youths waived Miranda at statistically similar rates. While police
used maximization techniques more when they interrogated boys,
they otherwise questioned boys and girls in the same ways. Boys
and girls exhibited similar attitudes-cooperative or resistant-and
confessed at comparable rates. Gender disparities have long
plagued juvenile justice administration. Against the historical
backdrop of gender inequalities, police interrogation practices with
boys and girls were remarkably even handed.
A substantial disconnect appears, however, between seemingly
even-handed interrogation practices, and police and justice system
personnel's characterizations of girls. Consistent with other
qualitative research on girls and juvenile justice,253 justice system
actors ascribed to girls primarily negative attributes-emotional,
manipulative, verbally aggressive, and confrontational. Should
juvenile justice personnel be more aware of these differences in
252. Interview with Juvenile Public Defender, in St. Paul, Minn. (Dec. 17,
2010) (On file with the author).
253. See, e.g., Baines & Adler, supra note 226; Bond-Maupin et al., supra
note 44; Gaarder et al., supra note 61, 556-58.
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perceptions? Even if girls and boys waive Miranda and police
question them similarly, do gender stereotypes and implicit
attributions elicit the negative behaviors for which justice system
personnel criticize girls? Do these negative perceptions affect the
quality of services justice personnel provide to young women within
the system?
We need more empirical research on interrogations practices in
general, in different settings, and with different types of suspects. If
police do not need gender-specific interrogation techniques, then do
officers require gender-sensitivity training? As more jurisdictions
adopt recording requirements, criminologists, lawyers, police, and
others can systematically study what happens in the interrogation
room. This will increase our fund of knowledge, enable us to develop
more effective techniques to elicit true confessions from guilty
defendants, reduce the likelihood of extracting false confessions
from innocent suspects, and provide a stronger basis for systemic
policy prescriptions.

